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L

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this article is to inquire into the nature and
function of contract law in a centrally planned economy. The economy chosen here is that of the Soviet Union. This study has been
divided into two parts; the first part deals with the role of plan
and contract in domestic trade, the second part deals with the
place of contract and plan in the foreign trade of the Soviet Union.
The institution of contract in the Soviet Union, for purposes
of domestic trade, is but a legal expression of the operational independence of the various state enterprises working to discharge
their respective responsibilities under an overall plan. It will be
seen that to a large extent the plan itself would be an empty
slogan without the mechanism of contract enabling these enterprises to enter into reciprocal money-commodity exchanges on a
footing of equality. This promotes economic rationality and calculability within the socialist economy.
An attempt will also be made in Part I to examine the nature
of contractural relations between, as well as the limits on the
freedom to contract enjoyed by, the various economic units opera ting within Soviet society. This will be done by examining the
most important substantive and procedural principles of contract
law relating to the production and sale of producer and consumer
goods in the Soviet Union.
Also examined in Part I is the machinery for the resolution of
contractual disputes in the Soviet Union. The machinery examined
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is the special system of economic courts called the State Arbitrazh. Apart from its crucial role in the resolution of economic
disputes, the State A rbitrazh will also be seen to serve as a watchdog over the plan-implementing process as a whole.
Part II focuses on the legal mechanics of Soviet foreign trade.
Special attention is paid to the major procedural and substantive
principles of Soviet import-export law. Parallels between the law
of domestic contracts and the law of foreign contracts will be
drawn where possible, and the role of planning agencies in foreign
trade will also be examined. Finally, Part II will examine some
pertinent contractual problems of East-West joint ventures in the
Soviet Union within the context of the national plan. This part will
also be attentive to the special peculiarities of the Soviet foreign
trade system and law in the formation and execution of foreign
contracts, and in the resolution of contractual disputes - both in
the import-export field and in the field of joint ventures.

IL PART I:
DOMESTIC TRADE AND THE PLANNED ECONOMY
A.

An Overview of the Machinery for Implementing the Plan:
The Institutions of Contract and Arbitrazh

During the early revolutionary years of the Soviet Union, an
attempt was made to administer the economy without the instrument of contract. On August 30, 1918, a decree ordered enterprises
to place their production at the disposal of the state agencies which
distributed it. In turn, enterprises were to apply to state agencies
for materials needed. These transactions were settled exclusively
"by bookkeeping entries without the use of monetary units." 1 Centralized supply and distribution of materials, products and food
were carried out, to quote Venediktov, "almost exclusively in the
form of administrative legal norms and acts and left almost no
place for civil law transactions." 2

1. Loeber, Plan and Contract Performance in Soviet Law. The Impact of Planning
Acts on the Performance of Delivery Contracts in the Post-War Practice of the US.S.R.
State Arbitrazh, 1964 U. ILL. L.F. 128, 128 (1964).
2. Venediktov, Grazhdanskoye zakonodatel'stov v period inostrannoy voemoy interventsiyii grazhdenskoy voiny 1918-20 (Civil Legislation in the Period of Foreign
Military Intervention and the Civil War 1918-1920), in LGU, 210 UCHYONYYE ZAPISKI
(SCHOLARLY NOTES) 70, 96, 117 (1955).
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Within a few years this led to a breakdown in the exchange of
goods and there emerged in place of the exchange of goods a private market of purchase and sale trade. Lenin himself urged in
1921 that "we must now admit this if we do not want to hide our
heads under our wings, if we do not want to be like those who do
not realize when they are beaten ...." 3 As a result, contracts were
reintroduced and contract law was codified in the then newly
enacted Civil Codes.'
With the Five-Year Plan of 1928, which introduced large scale
planning within the economy, contracts between socialist organizations became planned contracts. The main feature of planned
contracts is that planning predetermines the essential conditions
of the contract. A planning (or administrative) act called the
nariad is addressed to the appropriate enterprise which must then
implement the plan through a concrete contract.
This integration of political and economic authority is a basic
concept of socialism requiring state ownership of the means of production and the direction of economic life by the state economic
plan. The Council of Ministers is responsible for making and executing the plan, and is the highest executive and administrative
organ of the state. It is served by four main administrative bodies:
The State Planning Commission (Gosplan), which draws up the
Five-Year annual and quarterly plans for the Soviet Union as a
whole; the State Bank (Gosbank), which supervises the entire
credit and financial structure of the national economy; the Economic Council (Ekonomsoviet), which coordinates the work of the
various economic ministries and controls trade among them; and
the Council of Defense. The members of the Council of Ministers
are heads of various economic and other ministries. 5
Plans for distribution begin with the submission of applications
by the enterprises to their superior agencies showing the requirements of each enterprise for the coming year. These applications are studied and corrected when necessary by these agencies.
They are then forwarded to the Republican and All-Union
ministries from which they are forwarded to Ekonomsoviet and to
3. V. LENIN, 9 SELECTED WORKS, 288-89 (1937).
4. For further discussion of these early principles of Soviet contract law see V. GsovSKI, I SOVIET CIVIL LAW 415, 447, 448-84 (1948). For English text of the RSFSR Civil Code
see id., Vol. II, at 16 (1949).
5. Berman, Commercial Contracts in Soviet Law, 35 CALIF. L. REV. 191-94 (1947)
[hereinafter cited as Berman, Commercial Contracts].
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Gosplan. In this way the applications move up from the immediate
producers and consumers to the highest planning organs. 6
There are many plans; for example, All-Union plans, Republican plans, plans of Councils of National Economy and plans of
enterprises. The plans of enterprises, i.e. , the plans of those entities which enter into contracts with each other, do not specify to
whom the products of the enterprise should be delivered, nor do
they lay down who will supply the enterprise with the necessary
materials. The plan of an enterprise directs its internal operation
and is not concerned with creating relations with buyers or suppliers. Thus, under article 43 of the Statute of the Socialist State
Production Enterprise, 7 an enterprise must draft its own "longterm and annual plans for all types of its activity," and under article
45 an enterprise is specifically required to "work out an expanded
annual technical-industrial-financial plan ... [as well as] quarterly
and monthly plans for production and economic activity ...." Under
the same article an enterprise is further required to "establish independently the quantitative and qualitative plan indicators for
[its] shops, sections, services ... and other subdivisions." 8
The first step in establishing relations between enterprises
(e.g., between buyer and seller) is taken when the superior agency
of the enterprise concerned (e.g., a Council of National Economy)
issues its production, delivery and distribution plans. Once the
All-Union plan has been approved, each superior agency receives
its plan showing the types and quantities of products allocated to
it for the given planning year. The superior agency distributes
this allocation through its sales organizations among the enterprises under its jurisdiction. The allocation begins with the agency
notifying a subordinate enterprise of the types of quantities of the
materials and funds (fondy) allocated to that enterprise for the
planning year. The issuance of fondy is technically a certification
of the purchaser's right to procure goods subject to delivery
under the nariad. 9 This, however, does not give the enterprise the
6. Id. at 199. See also Zile, Law and the Distribution of Consumer Goods in the
Soviet Union, 1964 U. ILL. L.F. 212, 233-34 (1964).
7. Confirmed by Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers, Oct. 1965, [1965), Sob. post
S.S.S.E. Nos. 19-20, item 155. For English text see W. BUTLER, THE SOVIET LEGAL
SYSTEM-LEGISLATION AND DOCUMENTATION 169 (1978).
8. See Loeber, supra note 1, at 134.
9. Speer, Contract Rights and the Planned Economy: Peaceful Co-existence Under
the 1969 Soviet Statutes on Deliveries of Goods, 3 L. & POL. IN INT'L Bus. 510, 513-15 (1971).
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right to claim the material either from the superior agency allocating it or from the prospective supplier who is, in any case, assigned
only at a later stage. The right of a consumer enterprise to claim
the allocated material arises only after the superior agency has
issued a delivery or distribution order to a supplier and the supplier and consumer have concluded a contract on the basis of such
an order. 10
The function of notification is to enable the consumer enterprise to specify to the superior agency the precise nature of its
operational needs in terms of the quantity and quality of the material in question. After receipt of such specification the superior
agency forwards the documentation to its sales department, which
then issues production and delivery orders to a supplier-enterprise. The issuance of production and delivery orders marks the
second stage in which the orders are treated as legally binding administrative orders. These orders are not subject to change or
cancellation even by agreement of the parties. 11 It also marks an
important stage in the planning process, for it is here that plan
and contract meet.
Two types of delivery orders must be distinguished. The first
is the order naming the supplier and buyer individually and
creating an obligation on the part of the named parties to conclude
a contract. The second type of delivery order is one which names
the supplier but leaves the name of the buyer blank and instead
names the superior agency (e.g., a Council of National Economy)
as recipient. This type of order creats no obligation to establish
contractual relations. The product listed in the delivery order
must, however, be distributed in the form of distribution orders
among the superior agency's subordinate organizations within fifteen . days. 12 A distribution order from a superior agency creates
an obligation to establish contractual relations between the sup10. Loeber, supra note 1, at 136. See also Comment, The Role of State Arbitrazh
Under the New Conditions of Economic Management in the Soviet Union, 116 U. PA. L.R.
1285, 1290 (1968) [hereinafter cited as State A rbitrazh ].
11. Zamengof, Combining Guidance by State Plan and Economic Independence in
Contractual Independence and Contractual Relationships, 2 SOVIET L. & GOV'T 27 (No. l,
1963).
12. Decree of June 30, 1962, §§ 2-3; [1962), Sob. post. S.S.S.R. No. 12, item 94; Statute
on Deliveries of Products, §§ 7 and 70, as amended [hereinafter cited as 1962 SDP), cited in
Loeber, supra note l, at 139.
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plier and buyer named therein. 13 Another type of distribution
order is the unloading order of a buyer to the supplier, requiring
delivery to a third party. That order is based on an already existing contract between the buyer and supplier and therefore does
not establish contractual relations between them. 14
The two types of delivery orders and the first type of distribution order are planning acts insofar as they emanate from a superior
planning agency. Such acts are issued at monthly or quarterly intervals, but in case of disruptions of the plan or in other cases of
need, delivery and distribution orders are issued on an ad hoc
basis for individual deliveries. 15 In this way the transformation of
the plan into individual acts is a continuous process.
The delivery and distribution orders (but not the unloading
orders) bind their recipients, but, as Loeber points out, they bind
only "administratively, i.e., through administrative channels of subordination."16 They do not create obligations of delivery or payment, for these can arise only from a contract. Yet w bile planning
acts do not replace contracts, most Soviet jurists, as well as nonSoviet writers such as Berman, affirm that they create a "pre-contract obligation" on the parties to conclude a civil-law contract. 11
Both pre-contract disputes and contractual disputes are adjudicated by a special system of economic courts called the State Arbitrazh. The regular courts lack jurisdiction over disputes between socialist enterprises. A rbitrazh is an administrative agency,
though it acts to a considerable extent in a judicial manner. For
example, Point 88 of the A rbitrazh Rules requires that
the State Arbitrazh agencies ... set forth in their awards the
essence of the dispute, and the statements and explanations of
the parties, the experts, and the enterprises, organizations and
institutions not parties to the dispute. The award should also
state the considerations by which the Arbitrazh agency was
guided in arriving at it, with reference to the laws, decrees and

13. Instruction of Dec. 18, 1962, § 1, 22 Sbornik 12-15, (1962), cited in Loeber, supra
note l, at 139.
14. See 1962 SDP, supra note 12, at§ 28 (and 373) and of goods§ 15 (and§ 76); Instruction of Dec. 18, 1962. § 8, 22 Sbornik 12-15.
15. Loeber, supra note l, at 140.
16. Id.
17. Id. See also Berman, Commercial Contracts, supra note 5, at 204.
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orders of the government, and other normative acts, as well as
the principal evidence in the case. 18

Disputes arising between enterprises within a single ministry
are decided by Departmental A rbitrazh. Contractual disputes between agencies belonging to different ministries are decided by
State Arbitrazh at Union and Republican levels. 19 Each organ of
the State A rbitrazh is subordinated to a higher administrative
body, e.g., the Council of Ministers of the USSR or the Council of
Ministers of the various union and autonomous republics. The administrative body appoints A rbitrazh members and has power to
reverse or modify State A rbitrazh decisions. A case ·may be
brought before State Arbitrazh in any one of four ways: first, at
the request of the appropriate Council of Ministers; second, at the
request of a superior organ of State A rbitrazh; third, on its own
initiative; or fourth, at the suit of an interested party. In any of
the four ways the 1963 Rules for Consideration of Economic
Disputes by State A rbitrazh Agencies provides that "representatives of the public and of the active membership of the economic
unit may participate in meetings of State A rbitrazh agencies." 20
In every case the Arbiter has broad powers. He may question
the parties and come to their aid so that no party gains an unfair
advantage over the other due to ignorance of the law, etc. He may
decide a case on an entirely new basis, including one not argued by
the parties, or he may give judgment beyond the claim or counterclaim of either party. 21
An order for specific performance is almost always made.
This is so regardless of whether or not damages have been
ordered to compensate loss arising from a breach of contract. 22
This constitutes an important principle of Soviet contract law and
is discussed below at a more appropriate stage.
Despite its wide powers, A rbitrazh is nevertheless bound by
law. Article 4 of its Statute provides that State A rbitrazh "shall
18. Shapkina & Petrov, Commentary on the Rules for the Consideration of Economic
Disputes by State Arbitration Agencies, 3 SOVIET L. & Gov'T 38, 43 (No. 2, 1964).
19. Berman, Commercial Contracts, supra note 5, at 204-05. See also H. BERMAN,
JUSTICE IN THE U.S.S.R. 124, et seq. (1963); Loeber, supra note 1, at 131-32.
20. The New Rules for Consideration of Economic Disputes by State Arbitration
Agencies, 2 SOVIET L. & Gov·T 57, 59 (No. 3, 1963-64). See also Fal'kovich & Barash, Commentary on the Rules for Consideration of Economic Disputes by State Arbitrazh Agencies, 2 SOVIET L. & GOV'T 55, 56 (No. 4, 1964).
21. See Shapkina & Petrov, supra note 18.
22. See Berman, Commercial Contracts, supra note 5, at 207.
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be guided in its activity by laws of the USSR, edicts of the
Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, decrees and regulations
of the USSR government, other normative acts, and the present
statute." 23 As Loeber has observed, however, "[d]isputes before
A rbitrazh are not necessarily legal in character, they may also involve questions of economic expediency .... A rbitrazh decisions
have often an operative rather than a judicial character: they are
part of day-to-day economic administration." 24
Under the Order of the USSR Council of Ministers of July 23,
1959, "On Improving the Work of State Arbitrazh," enterprises
are required to present their claims to the other party and take all
possible steps to settle controversies before submitting an action
to an Arbitrazh agency. 25 Point 8 of the Arbitrazh Rules of 1963
also requires prior direct negotiation between the parties within
ten days after a pre-contract dispute has arisen. 26 A rbitrazh cannot consider a case unless this has taken place. If within an additional ten days the dispute cannot be settled by negotiation, the
party that proposed the original terms must submit the dispute to
A rbitrazh. Failure to do so signifies acceptance of the terms proposed by the other party. 27
Disputes arising from existing contracts must be submitted
within one month of breach and the other party must respond to
the claim within that time. 28 The claim must specify the name of
the enterprise against which the claim is being made, the nature
of the breach and the legal basis of the claim as well as the nature
of the relief sought.
The Rules govern all cases unless otherwise provided for, as
for example, in cases involving shipments. Article 76 of the Principles of Civil Legislation of the USSR makes separate provision
for shipments. 29 The period of limitation laid down under this
23. Statute on State Arbitrazh Attached to the USSR Council of Ministers, Confirmed
by Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers, Jan. 18, 1974, [1974], Sob. post. S.S.S.R. No. 4,
item 19. For English text see W. BUTLER, supra note 7, at 253.
24. Loeber, supra note 1, at 146.
25. Fal'kovich & Barash, supra note 20, at 55.
26. Point 8 of the Rules of Consideration of Economic Disputes by State Arbitrazhes,
Decree No. P-4 of State Arbitrazh of the USSR Council of Ministers, July l, 1963, 2 SOVIET
STATUTES & DECISIONS 26 (No. 1, 1965) [hereinafter referred to as 1963 Rules].
27. Point 9 of the 1963 Rules, supra note 26.
28. Id., Point 10.
29. Fundamental Principles of Civil Legislation of the USSR and Union Republics,
adopted by law of the USSR Supreme Soviet Dec. 8, 1961 [hereinafter cited as 1961 Principles]. For English text see W. BuTLER, supra note 7, at 393.
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statute is six months, while claims for fines must be presented
within 45 days. The 1963 Rules, therefore, do not apply to such
cases.
Disputes are considered in the area of jurisdiction of an A rbitrazh agency within which the respondent is located. In cases in
which both parties are located in different Republics or regions,
the area of jurisdiction is the plantiff's choice. 30
Liberman asserts that Arbitrazh agencies can initiate suits
against, for example, a supplier if they receive information
(through the press or any other source) to the effect that goods
shipped are of inferior quality. 31 Individual cases may be submitted by Arbitrazh to the procurator's office for the application of
penal sanctions against managers found guilty of mismanagement
leading to inferior products. 32 Fal'kovich and Barash point out that
a superior agency may also initiate an action on behalf of a subordinate enterprise. 33
A rbitrazh may join, on its own initiative, one or more parties
as respondent[s] to a dispute before it. Likewise, it may sever a
respondent from the proceedings. 34 As will be discussed later, 35
Arbitrazh can award costs to either party, although normally
costs are levied against the respondent in proportion fo the
amount of the claim granted.
All awards are binding and must be complied with voluntarily
within the period stated for compliance in the award (Point 97 of
the 1963 Rules), or if there is no such compliance, the plaintiff may
petition to the arbitration agency for an order of compulsory execution.36 If A rbitrazh awards are not voluntarily executed in time
30. Fal'kovich & Barash, supra note 20, at 59. See Point 14(c) of the 1963 Rules, supra
note 26.
31. Liberman, Arbitration Practice in Cases Involving the Quality and Completeness
of Production, 3 SOVIET L. & GOV'T 47, 52 (No. 2, 1964).
32. See the case of the Uzbek Tractor Assembly Plant, id. at 54, where the procurator's office, after receiving the record of an Arbitrazh agency showing mismanagement
in a case, decided not to prosecute because the individual concerned had been issued a warning.
33. Fal'kovich & Barash, supra note 20, at 60; Point 6 of the 1963 Rules, supra note 26.
34. Fal'kovich & Barash, supra note 20, at 60.
35. See text accompanying note 212, infra.
36. Point 98 of the 1963 Rules, supra note 26. Shapkina & Petrov thus regard all
awards as having "the force of writs of execution." Shapkina & Petrov, supra note 18, at 44.
Under point 101 of the 1963 Rules, awards are said to have "the force of documents of execution."
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the guilty party may be fined. 37 Under Point 101 of the Rules,
monetary awards (damages and fines) are executed through banks
upon order of an Arbitrazh agency. Under Article 58 of the Principles of Civil Procedure of the USSR, 38 orders to confiscate property in kind, evictions, etc., can be executed through bailiffs. 39

B.

P/,an, Contract and the Principle of Economic Independence

1.

THE SCOPE FOR OPERATIONAL INDEPENDENCE

The Party Program and the resolution of the November, 1962,
Plenum of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee called for greater centralization in the planning of the economy as well as for expansion
of economic independence of enterprises within the framework of
a unified economic plan. 40 A legal expression of this independence
is the contract.
In view of the pervasive effect of planning in a socialist
economy, economic "independence" and "freedom" of contract
must be understood as operating within the framework of the general plan. In this way, planning cannot but influence contract law.
What is officially called "the economic independence and initiative
of the enterprise" 41 can, however, be seen to be developing in
three directions. First, in that range of contracts concluded between enterprises on their own initiative and in the absence of an
obligatory plan assignment, one enterprise selects another party
and enters into contractual relations for the delivery of consumer
goods or other industrial goods. As will be seen below, in 1969 new
statutes were enacted which gave enterprises greater room
within which to exercise their initiative in selecting their own suppliers of consumer goods. 42 With respect to other commodities, the
37. Point 99 of the 1963 Rules, supra note 26. See also Shapkina & Petrov, supra note
18, at 44; summary statement of the 1963 rules entitled The New Rules of Consideration of
Economic Disputes by State Arbitration Agencies, supra note 20, at 60.
38. 1961 Principles, supra note 29. For English text see W. BUTLER, supra note 7, at
393.
39. Shapkina & Petrov, supra note 18, at 44. See also The New Rules for Consideration of Economic Disputes by State Arbitration Agencies, supra note 20, at 60.
40. For text of the November 1962 resolution, see 14 CURRENT DIG. SOVIET PRESS 12
(No. 48, 1962).
41. Statute on the Socialist State Production Enterprise, art. l, para. l, Confirmed by
Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers, Oct. 4, 1967 [1965], Sob. post. S.S.S.R. Nos. 19-20,
item 155. For English text see W. BUTLER, supra note 7, at 169.
42. See 18 EKONOMICHESKAIA GAZETA (1969) for text of the Statute on Deliveries of
Products Intended for Production and Technical Use [hereinafter cited as 1969 SDP]. See
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market quotas of which are not covered by the plan, decrees were
passed in 1957 and 1960 by the Russian Soviet Federated Soviet
Republic (RSFSR) Council of Ministers granting trade agencies
the right of unrestricted purchase of such commodities. 43
Similarly, Article 84 of the Regulations on the Economic
Council of the Economic Administrative District (1957) granted
the Council the power to permit its subordinate enterprises to sell
at will, to state enterprises, industrial products for which no market quota was provided under the plan. 44 Another decree entitled
the "Enlargement of the Rights of Enterprise Directors" conferred on these officials the power to accept orders from other enterprises for the production of castings, forgings, stampings, machine
parts, etc., made from a customer's materials, provided that this
did not negatively affect fulfillment of the plan for production of
products for sale in the models approved for the factory. They
were also granted the power to enter into construction and erection contracts with other enterprises. 45
Berman reports that with the increase of directors' authority,
there has been a corresponding increase of personal liability for
failure to perform assigned duties. This has given rise to the concept of "economic crime" for which a director may be punished.
Examples of "economic crime" include: "breach of technological
discipline," production of goods of inferior quality, and malicious
non-fulfillment of contracts. 46
The scope of these initiatives is always limited, and any freedom of initiative, if such freedom exists at all, is usually created
by a prior enabling decree or law. 47 The official view is that with
th~ consolidation of communism, greater freedom of contract will
emerge: "As the material and technical base for communism is
18-19 ECONOMICHESKAIA GAZETA (1969) for text of the Statute on Deliveries of Consumer
Goods [hereinafter cited as 1969 SDG].
43. Decrees of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, Dec. 19, 1957, and Dec. 5, 1960. Sob.
post. R.S.F.S.R. [1958], No. 6, item 62; [1960], No. 42, item 207, cited in Zamengof, supra note
11, at 27 n.1.
44. [1957], Sob. post. S.S.S.R., No. 12, item 121, cited in Zamengof, supra note 11, at 32
n.1.
45. Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on Enlargement of the Rights of
Enterprise Directors, Aug. 9, 1955, [1955], Postanovleniia TsK KPSS i Soveta Ministrov
S.S.S.R. po voprosam promyshlennosti i stroitel'stva za 1952-1955 gg., Gozpolitizdat, 91
(Moscow 1956), cited in Zamengof, supra note 11, at 32 n.2.
46. Berman, Commercial Contracts, supra note 5, at, 194-195.
47. See Zamengof, supra note 11, at 27.
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strengthened, as the country's productive forces develop and the
shortage of industrial production is reduced, the range of such
relationships will expand." 48 Freedom of contract in this sense is
not to be regarded as a natural right but rather as a right emerging from progressing social conditions.49
The second trend revealing some freedom of initiative among
enterprises is found in "the expansion of the range of items arrived
at by agreement between the parties in compulsory relationships
arising out of plan assignments that are obligatory for both parties and out of contracts based thereon, with a corresponding diminution in the items determined by plan." 50 Again, the scope for
such initiative is limited and has been described by Zamengof as
being dependent on "further improvement in the planning process."51 One such improvement was the 1965 Statute, described
below.
The third area of initiative lies in the general reduction of detailed mandatory instructions from planning agencies to their
subordinate agencies. This reduction has left the subordinate
agencies greater overall discretion to delimit their own conditions
and terms of contract. Some progress has been made in this direction by the 1965 and 1969 statutes, as will be discussed below. 52
The three areas discussed, however, merely describe the degree
of potential freedom-actual freedom being possible only where
there are enabling statutes (such as the 1965 and 1969 statutes).
It is also clear that where a planning act imposes conditions
(e.g., regarding the subject-matter of the contract or the time for
fulfillment) the parties cannot contravene those conditions either
by agreement or by arbitration. 53 In the event of conflict between
contract and plan, the latter prevails. 54
The parties to a contract cannot rescind that contract or
modify its terms if such rescission or modification conflicts with
48. Id.
49. H. BERMAN, JUSTICE IN THE U.S.S.R., supra note 19, at 141.
50. See Zamengof, supra note 11, at 27.
51. Id.
52. See Section B sub-section 2 and Part A Section D of this study, infra.
53. Loeber, supra note l, at 150; Zamengof, supra note 11, at 29.
54. Point 15 of the Decree of the USSR Council of People's Commissars, Dec. 19, 1933,
[1933], Sots. Zak. S.S.S.R., No. 73, art. 445; art. 52 of the Statute on Deliveries of Products
for Equipment and Production; art. 48 of the Statute on Deliveries of Consumer Goods,
cited in Zamengof, supra note 11, at 29 n.18.
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the plan. 55 If, however, the contract is a voluntary one, rescission
should be possible and, likewise, if any of the terms of an obligatory contract have been left to the discretion of the parties, those ·
terms may be modified or cancelled by agreement although the
contract itself cannot be terminated.
At least one Soviet writer has suggested that the right of cancellation of contracts should be given to enterprises even if this
cancellation conflicts with the plan, provided that cancellation is
required by changed circumstances and that its overall aim is the
better implementation of the plan:
However, since [the contract] is conditioned in the final
analysis by the requirements of the economic law of planned, proportional development of the economy, and since the role of the
contract is that of an auxilliary to the plan, this rule [concerning
the inability of parties to cancel an obligatory contract], it would
seem, would be subject to exception specifically in cases in
which, as a consequence of various circumstances, further maintenance of the contract might become an obstacle to proper execution by economic organizations of the plans established for
them. This would apply when cancellation or modification, if it
does not threaten disruption of proportions established by plan,
could at the same time promote the most successful fulfillment of
these plans, reinforcement of cost-accounting, economy, and
more rational and effective utilization of resources in money and
materials. Specifically, it would seem that cancellation of a contract would be entirely permissible, regardless of whether or not
the plan assignment on which it was based has been cancelled, if,
as a consequence of change in the line of production or introduction of efficiency measures the purchaser no longer needs the
products assigned him under the plan and provided for by the
contract, or if as a consequence of consistent failure on the part
of the contracted supplier, an economic organization seeks other
sources for satisfaction of its needs ....56

This exception has not been embodied in any legislation and
its status is therefore uncertain. In fact, Article 33 of the 1961
Principles of Civil Legislation 57 forbids a "unilateral refusal to fulfill an obligation ... except in cases provided by law." It is of
55. Loeber, supra note l, at 159; Zamengof, supra note 11, at 30.
56. Zamengof, supra note 11, at 30.
57. 1961 Principles, art. 33, para. 4, supra note 29. For English text see W.
supra note 7, at 393, 404.
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course possible to argue that a mutually agreed decision to rescind is not "unilateral" and, therefore, not covered by Article 33.
The general rule is that contracts cannot contravene the plan, as
provided by Article 34 of the 1961 Principles. Loeber, however,
states that A rbitrazh, in the exercise of its power of day-to-day
economic administration, can consider questions of "economic expediency, such as the refusal to buy unwanted products." 58 Arbitrazh can therefore ·exempt a party from taking delivery of (unwanted) goods.
Furthermore, the parties need not even stipulate the plan
conditions in the contract, though the contract is always deemed
to be regulated by the conditions specified in the planning act.
Thus, for example, if the supplier and purchaser carried out the
delivery and acceptance of goods specified in the planning act before the time ordained for concluding the contract, that contract
need not even have been entered into. 59
Point 4 of the decree of the USSR Council of Ministers, "On
Further Improvement of the Procedure For Conclusion of Contracts for Delivery of Equipment and Materials for the Use of Enterprises and Organizations" (1962), provides that when delivery
orders issued to a supplier and purchaser contain all the data
needed for shipment (e.g., quantity, items, quality, delivery dates),
and if no further agreement between the parties upon other conditions is required, contractual relations are established upon
receipt and acceptance of the order. 60 On the other hand, cancellation or amendment of the plan assignment or the plan itself leads
to the automatic cancellation or modification of the corresponding
contract or its terms, as the case may be. This is followed by an
automatic substitution of the relevant plan conditions, even if no
further agreement has been made incorporating the plan changes. 61
The "brooding omnipresence" of the plan (to use Holmesian
phraseology) not only guides contractual relations but also establishes the range of permitted leeway. It further serves as a
58. Loeber, supra note 1, at 146.
59. Decree of May 22, 1959, Sob. post. S.S.S.R. No. 11 item 68; Statute on Delivery of
Consumer Goods§ 6(4) [hereinafter cited as 1959 SDG]; Statute on Delivery of Products§
10(2) [hereinafter cited as 1959 SDP].
60. Decree cited by Zamengof, supra note 11, at 28. Article 4 of the 1961 Principles,
supra note 29 provides that civil rights and obligations arise "from administrative acts ...
and from planning acts." See also 1959 SDP § 5(3), and 1959 SDG § 6(4), supra note 59.
61. Zamengof, supra note 11, at 30-31; see also Loeber, supra note 1, at 146-47.
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reminder that contract is an auxiliary tool in the implementation
of the plan and cannot be used as an instrument for monitoring the
plan, for correcting planning errors or for exercising economic or
contractual independence contrary to the plan.
It is however, noteworthy that Point 8 of the 1962 decree
mentioned above, as well as Article 62 of the 1965 Statute on the
Socialist State Economic Enterprise 62 gives enterprises the right
to refuse to sign contracts for the supply to them of products that
are either "superfluous," "unneeded," or in excess of their needs.
The refusal must be made within ten days of the receipt of a delivery order. If the refusal is not communicated to the supplier
within the time limit, delivery, generally, must take place as required in the planning act. 63
Speer is of the view that it was to be left to the enterprise rejecting the goods to determine whether they were "unneeded." He
cites a State A rbitrazh holding of 1963 that a purchaser's rejection
of the goods allocated was the exercise of a right and that the fine
for failure to contract was not applicable in such cases.~ A rbitrazh
practice on this issue, however, is not uniform. In the 1968 case, a
State A rbitrazh held that even if the p:urchaser had failed to give
notice of rejection within ten days he was not bound to conclude a
contract for unwanted goods.
There appears to be no legislation regarding notification of
changes in the plan. In particular, there is no allocation of responsibility for notification. The question appears to have been left for
A rbitrazh agencies to determine on an equitable basis. A rbitrazh
have freed innocent parties from liability for the non-fulfillment of
changed plan assignments where such parties were either unaware of the changes or informed of the changes too late. In some
instances, when one of the parties has been held responsible for
not informing the other of the change, the suit was dismissed with
costs against the party responsible, particularly if the latter had
itself brought the suit. 65 This practice involves a principle analogous to the common law maxim that "he who comes to equity must
come with clean hands." Zamengof goes further and advocates
4

62. See Section B(2), infra.
63. Zamengof, supra note 11, at 29. See also Maggs, Soviet Corporation Law: The
New Statute on the Socialist State Production Enterprise, 14 AM. J . COMP. L. 478, 487
(1965-66); Speer, supra note 9, at 526-27.
64. Speer, supra note 9, at 527.
65. Zamengof, supra note 11, at 32.
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that the party "guilty" of withholding information must be held
liable for financial and economic loss resulting from failure to
notify. 66
The case of Myshega Armature Work v. Venikov Armature
Works 61 illustrates the subordinate position of contract vis-a-vis
the plan. A contract between two enterprises provided for the delivery of 1,230 electric drives by the Venikov Plant to the
Myshega Plant. A planning act was issued which necessitated a
change in the number of electric drives required. A local arbitration board determined that 1000 drives were necessary. When this
number of drives was not delivered in full, the Myshega Plant filed
a suit before the State A rbitrazh Commission of the RSFSR Council of Ministers. The Commission found that the local Arbitrazh
agency had erred in fixing the number of drives at 1,000 and that
the correct figure, under the planning act, should have been 587.
Since the respondent had delivered this number in full the suit
was dismissed. 68 The State Arbitrazh Commission proceeded on
the principle that the change required by the planning act was
automatically written into the contract regardless of the agreement between the parties. The case also shows that even Arbitrazh decisions are subject to review by superior A rbitrazh
agencies in the event of a nonconformity of an award to the plan.
While fully acknowledging the overall superiority of the plan,
Bratus and Alekseev argue that planning agencies should not be
allowed to exercise "excessive tutelage" over the enterprises so
that the latter are assured of at least a minimum degree of independence or autonomy. To this end, they advocate the maintenance
of a strict division of functions between planning agencies and
economic enterprises common between directors of enterprises
and the enterprise themselves. Planning agencies are those agencies which approve plan assignments, allocate raw materials and
other resources, and assign equipment and funds to enterprises.
They do not enter into direct productive or other economic activity,
do not buy or sell goods, and do not acquire or operate the means
of production. Bratus and Alekseev are of the view that the division of function will minimize excessive control of industrial enter66. Id.
67. Id. at 35 n.24.
68. The Myshega Armature Works case is summarized in Zamengof, supra note 11, at
35 n.24.
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prises by planning agencies, and suggest that this division must be
sanctioned by law:
Therefore, there is needed not only a precise delimitation, formulated in law, of the competence of the various planning and regulatory agencies, but a similar delimitation of the rights and
duties of the agencies in question, on the one hand, and of the
rights and duties of socialist enterprises and other cost accounting organizations, on the other. It is necessary to protect the
enterprise against excessive tutelage and administrative zeal on
the part of the planning and regulating agencies. 69

The foregoing shows that planning affects contracts and sets
the limits of contractual freedom and operational independence of
socialist enterprises. Contracts and the relative ease or freedom to
conclude contracts show the degree of operational independence
present. At the same time contracts appear to serve as the chief
instrument for the detailed implementation of the plan itself. Furthermore, the official view is that freedom of contract and operational independence emerge with the consolidation and improvement of the socialist mode of production.
In the meantime, the planning process utilizes what Bratus
and Alekseev have called "the principle of democratic
centralism." 70 This principle, in their opinion, manifests the
economic independence of enterprises and involves not only the
working out of details and specifications for the execution of the
plan, but also a say in the planning process itself. Such input is
facilitated by providing for the submission of requests and drafts of
plans to planning agencies and by providing procedures by which
planning agencies may be asked to withdraw or modify specific plan
assignments. 71
Berman writes that the modification of plans in compliance
with requests from enterprises is a "common practice." "In fact,"
he observes, "one sometimes gains the impression from reading
Soviet legal literature and from talking with Soviet factory direc69. Bratus & Alekseev, The Treatment of Legal Problems Involved in the Management of the Economy, 3 SOVIET L. AND GOV'T 23, 28 (No. 1, 1964-65). On the definition of
"cost accounting" the .writers observe: "Actual cost accounting is possible only where
material values are produced and sold on the principle of recoupment (Vozmezdie) of costs
... ."Id.
70. Id. at 26. See also H. BERMAN, JUSTICE IN THE U.S.S.R., supra note 19, at 123.
71. Bratus & Alekseev, supra note 69, at 26.
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tors and economic officials, that plans are ultimately adapted to
the needs, capacities, and desires of the enterprises, despite the
overwhelming weight of bureaucratic controls." 72
A further factor in the direction of economic independence is
the principle of khozraschet, 728 or "business accountability." The
principle implies that business enterprises are responsible for
their debts, have to keep accurate accounts, and that their success
is measured largely in terms of their profits. 73 To give legal expression to the principle of business accountability, state enterprises have come to be regarded as juridical persons who are
liable for their debts to the extent of their turnover capital, and
whose property cannot be acquired except by contractual agreement.74
2.

ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE AND THE 1965 REFORMS

On October 4, 1965, the Statute on the Socialist State Economic
Enterprise 75 was passed. Article 1 declares that the socialist state
production enterprise shall be the basic link in the national economy
of the USSR, and that its activity shall be based upon the combination of centralized guidance with economic independence and initiative of the enterprise. Article 2 provides that the enterprise
shall work "under the direction of the superior agency in accordance with a national economic plan on the basis of economic accountability [and] shall fulfill its duties and shall enjoy the rights
connected with such activity, shall have an independent balance,
and shall be a juridical person." 76 This was the first instance of
legislative recognition of the socialist enterprise as a juridical person.
Under the Statute rights are stated as belonging to enterprises
rather than to managers as had tended to be the case previously. 77
72. H. BERM,'i.N, JUSTICE IN THE U.S.S.R., supra note 19, at 103, 140. See also text accompanying notes 5 and 6, supra.
728 • A term used to describe the basis on which state business enterprises enter into
relations with each other.
73. Zile, supra note 6, at 218.
74. Berman, Commerical Contracts, supra note 5, at 196; see also D. GRANICK,
MANAGEMENT OF THE INDUSTRIAL FIRM IN THE U.S.S.R. 24 (1959).
75. Statute on the Socialist State Production Enterprise, supra note 41. For English
text see W. BUTLER, supra note 7, at 169.
76. Id. at art. 2. For English text see w. BUTLER, supra note 7, at 169.
77. The statute makes detailed provision for the property and assets of the enterprise, Part II,§§ 11-40, as well as a host of other rights pertaining to its activities, Part IV
§§ 41-42. Under § 90 the director acts "in the name of [the] enterprise" rather than independently.
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Maggs suggests that this is significant because the manager was
"merely a subordinate bureaucrat in a long hierarchy of government officials .... The new law, by granting ... rights to the enterprise itself, opens the way for future procedural reform which
would provide real avenues for the enforcement of the rights." 78
Article 47 of the Statute provides that if changes in planned
tasks are necessary, prior consultation with the enterprise's management must be carried out. Maggs views this as mere "empty
language" however, since it cannot be enforced by any impartial
adjudicative body. 79 This implies that there are no procedural safeguards for enforcement and also that perhaps Arbitrazh agencies
are not considered by Maggs to be an "impartial adjucative body."
In contrast to this view, Hazard regards A rbitrazh agencies as
providing sufficient protection for the rights of enterprises: "[T]he
arbitration tribunals have been moving away from the position
given them when they were brought into being in their present
form in 1931 .... They have come nearer to the position of a court
charged with the protection of 'rights' through the stable application of law." 80
In the area of planning the most significant moves by the 1965
laws in favor of independence from the plan are the reduction of
the number of plan "indicators" by the Statute, and the shift of
emphasis toward profitability and output sold rather than gross
output. Prior to this, under a 1954 decree, 81 a superior organization
could set the following plan indicators for the enterprise: (a) output in monetary and physical terms; (b) the basic technical and
economic indicators of the use of raw materials and equipment;
(c) number of workers, total wages bill, labor productivity; (d) expenses of production; (e) costs of goods produced; (f) cost of the
most important man-produced items, and (g) receipts and expenditures.
78. Maggs, supra note 63, at 485; see also D. GRANICK, THE RED EXECUTIVE 318 (1960),
where the manager is described as an "organization man, filling a slot in an industrial
bureaucracy."
79. Maggs, supra note 63, at 486.
80. Hazard, Flexibility of Law in Soviet State Arbitration, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 120, 129-30 (P. Sanders ed. 1967).
81. Decree of August 2, 1954. 4 Direktivy KPSS i Sovetskogo pravitel'stva po khozyaystvennym voporsam. Sbornik Dokumentov 1917-1957 gg. [Directives of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Government on Economic Matters] (1958) 451. Collection of documents for the years 1917-1957 compiled by Malin & Korobov in 4 vols.
(Moscow 1957-58). Decree cited in Maggs, supra note 63, at 485.
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After the Reforms of 1965, this list was reduced to the following indicators: (a) the volume of sales output; (b) the basic types of
output; (c) the wages fund; (d) the amount of profit; and (e) payments to and appropriations from the budget. 82 The reduction has
meant that enterprises fulfill their production on the basis of completed contracts. Thus, contract terms as to quality, quantity, and
assortment have replaced many of the commanded indicators
previously imposed from above. 83
In fact, very often it was this predominance of plan over contract which resulted, in Maggs' opinion, in a lack of flexibility, an
indifference to the needs of industry, consumers, and the public, and an overemphasis on gross output at the expense of quality
and economy. 84 Attempts were made in the 1950's to introduce the
reduction of operating costs rather than gross output as the
primary measure of enterprise success. One of the changes which
has been incorporated in the 1965 Statute has been the creation of
the right of enterprises to reject unneeded goods. 85 The Statute also
seeks to prevent the production of unwanted goods by providing
that orders from trade organizations shall form the basis of contracts for the purchase of consumer goods and by prohibiting aboveplan production. This shows a shift away from "production for
production's sake" toward an emphasis on quality, economy and
more contractual freedom. 86
Since the goal of the reforms has been to minimize interference
from planning agencies, the quick settlement of pre-contract
disputes has assumed greater importance. Thus, disputes over
items which would previously have been governed by plan indicators must now be decided by the parties in pre-contract bargaining.
If irreconcilable differences arise during pre-contract negotiations,
such differences are to be settled in A rbitrazh-ordered pre-contract
settlements.

C.

Coexistence of Plan and Contract Law in the Soviet Union

Since contracts appear to play a crucial role in the Soviet economy, this paper will now examine briefly the important provisions
82. Maggs, supra note 63, at 486.
83. State Arbitrazh, supra note 10, at 1307.
84. Maggs, supra note 63, at 484-85.
85. Statute on the Socialist State Production Enterprise, art. 62, supra note 41. For
English text see W. BUTLER, supra note 7, at 169.
86. Maggs, supra note 63, at 484-85.
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of Soviet contract law as declared by statute and contract principles that have emerged in the resolution of pre-contract and
post-contract disputes before Arbitrazh. 87
1.

SOME IMPORT ANT SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL
PRINCIPLES OF SOVIET CONTRACT LAW

First, some introductory remarks concerning the general
principles governing purchases and sales are appropriate. Some of
these principles are similar to the Anglo-American law on the sale
of goods. Under Soviet law, the seller undertakes to transfer property to the purchaser and the latter agrees to accept such property and to pay therefore an agreed upon price. Ownership passes
at the time of the delivery of perishable goods, and, in the case of
nonperishable goods, on completion of the contract. Risk passes
with ownership unless the parties agree otherwise, but if the
goods deteriorate or are destroyed due to delayed delivery, the
party responsible for the delay bears the responsibility. 88
The Soviet Constitution places a limitation on what goods
may be purchased and sold, however, by declaring certain kinds of
property to be res extra commercium. Property that is not subject
to sale or purchase because of constitutional prohibitions includes
land and its natural deposits, waters, forests, railroads, business
enterprises of all kinds, and buildings. 89 A further limitation is imposed by the plan itself, which prescribes that certain types of
goods shall be bought and sold by certain types of enterprises. A
necessary consequence of this rule is that an enterprise cannot unilaterally change its own production plan.
Payments for goods bought under contract are based on the
principle of strict business accountability under which each enterprise is liable for its own debts. 90 Most payments are made
through banks so that the entire system operates on the basis of
what Berman calls "bookkeeping deductions." The chief form of
payment involves the buyer's acceptance of the payee's demand
87. Some of these principles have already been discussed or alluded to in the previous
section. In this section it is therefore appropriate to focus primarily on those rules which
have either not been covered yet or which require more detailed exposition.
88. Berman, Commercial Contracts, supra note 5, at 213.
89. USSR Const. Art. 6. cited in Berman, Commercial Contracts, supra note 5, at 215.
See also Cases 6 and 9, Id. at 227-28.
90. Art. 2, Statute on the Socialist State Production Enterprise, supra note 41. For
English text see W. BUTLER, supra note 7, at 169.
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made through the payee's bank. The latter bank then makes the
demand to the payor's bank. If the buyer does not notify his bank
of nonacceptance, his bank will debit the buyer's account and pay
the seller's bank. Other forms of payment take place through letters of credit, checks, or a periodic settlement of accounts called
"planned payments." 91
The 1961 Principles 92 contain some of the most important principles of Soviet contract law. Article 4 provides, as indicated
above, that rights and obligations arise not only from contracts
but also from planning acts. Article 34 affirms the general principle that the "content of a contract concluded on the basis of a planned task must conform to this task." The article also provides that
differences arising during the conclusion of the contract (i.e., in
the "pre-contract" stage) should be resolved by A rbitrazh. Article
36 provides that fines, penalties and forfeitures be awarded in the
event of the nonfulfillment of a contract, and forbids agreements
limiting liability. Agreements limiting liability for delivery of
goods of inferior quality have consequently been held by Arbitrazh to be invalid. 93
Two more principles should be noted. The first is that a breach
of contract creates a right to damages for the aggrieved party .94
Monetary awards are not only compensatory but also punitive, and
the enforcement of such awards is the right of the injured party as
well as that of the State. The second principle under Article 36 is
that payment of a fine, penalty or compensation does not release
the defaulting party from specific performance of the contract.
Liberman calls this "the principle of real fulfillment of obligation." 95
The principle of specific performance has been described as
one of the characteristics of Soviet contract law that distinguishes
it from Western law on the subject. 96 One of the principle's chief
91. Berman, Commercial Contracts, supra note 5, at 220-24.
92. 1961 Principles, supra note 29. For English text see W. BUTLER, supra note 7, at
393.
93. Liberman, supra note 31, at 48.
94. Eletskii Plant v. Division of Sales of Chief Administration of Metal Industry Arbitrazh [1938] No. 5 (in Russian) 21, cited in Berman, Commerical Contrats, supra note 5, Case
24, at 234.
95. Liberman, supra note 31, at 52.
96. Loeber, supra note l, at 160. Under the RSFSR CIVIL CODE the injured party has
the alternative of rejectl.ng performance and suing for damages alone, although Arbitrazh
practice has been to award performance where to do so would accord with the plan of
distribution issued for the parties. Berman, Commerical Contracts, supra note 5, at 213-14.
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purposes is to emphasize the primacy of the plan over contracts.
Another purpose is to discourage the practice of what has been
called "mutual amnesty," whereby the parties to a contract both
agree to waive their rights under it. Such practice, although it
may be expedient for the parties in the short term, is regarded by
State Arbitrazh as a long-term threat to the plan and, ultimately,
to the economy as a whole. 97 Thus, a purchaser cannot relieve the
supplier from his obligation to deliver, regardless of whether or
not the supplier has paid a fine for late delivery or for
nondelivery. Nor can the purchaser relieve the supplier from the
fine itself, for as State Arbitrazh asserted in 1962, "[a]ssessing
fines from the supplier is not only a right of the consumer, but also
a duty to the State." 98 This is another principle of Soviet contract
law distinguishing it from nonsocialist systems.
The Fundamental Principles of Civil Law adopted by the
Supreme Soviet of the USSR in 1961 also provide that liability for
breach of contract must be founded on fault, unless otherwise provided by law or by contract. This embodies a principle not supported by Anglo-American doctrine, which imposes liability for
breach of contract regardless of fault unless otherwise provided
by law or by contract. As will be seen later, however, the Soviet
principle has two important exceptions. 99
The Principles of 1961 also provide that a contract is deemed
to have been concluded when the parties thereto have reached
agreement on all its essential points, and that in the event of a
breach the obligor is obliged to compensate the obligee for all
resultant loss including loss of "income" (i.e., profits). 100
2.

CONTRACT LAW AND

A rbitrazh

PRACTICE

In a planned economy, the delivery contract is the most commonly found. 101 There are three ways of concluding such a
contract: 102 first, the supplier after receiving the delivery (distribu97. Loeber, supra note 1, at 169.
98. Id. See also Liberman, supra note 31, at 52.
99 .. See text accompanying notes 148-53, infra.
100. See Berman, Commercial Contracts, supra note 5, at 213-14 n.78.
101. Loeber, supra note 1, at 143. Other contracts are for the purchase of farm products-arts. 51-52 of the 1961 Principles, supra note 29; contracts for capital constructionarts. 67-71; and shipment contracts - arts. 72-77. For English text of these Articles see W.
BUTLER, supra note 7, at 393.
102. See Articles 44-50 of the 1961 Principles, supra note 29. For English text of these
Articles see W. BUTLER, supra note 7, at 393.

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol8/iss1/3

24

Dore: Plan and Contract in the U.S.S.R.

1980]

Plan and Contract in the U.S.S.R.

53

tion) order, i.e. , the nariad, drafts a contract and sends it to the
buyer named in the nariad. 103 If the buyer agrees with the draft he
returns it with his signature and the contract is concluded. In the
event of disagreement on the part of the buyer, the buyer must
draw up a "Protocol of Disagreement" and forward it to the supplier .104 It would appear that the buyer may disagree only on the
grounds that the proposed contract conflicts in one way or another
with the plan instructions, or that the instructions leave the point
in question to be worked out by the parties themselves. If the
disagreement cannot be resolved by the parties, the supplier must
file the Protocol with A rbitrazh within ten days. 105 Failure to act
within ten days would lead to the assumption that the supplier
had accepted the buyer's version of the contract as stated in the
Protocol. 106 In Pavlodarsky Tractor Factory v. Armmashsnabsbita, 101 the buyer refused to pay for goods on grounds .the goods
were incomplete. A lower Arbitrazh agency awarded the purchase
price to the seller, but State A rbitrazh of the USSR Council of
Ministers reversed the decision when it became clear that the
buyer had filed a Protocol of Disagreement describing the type of
goods it wanted. State Arbitrazh held that the seller, having
received the Protocol without objecting, was assumed to have accepted the buyer's proposals. 108
Second, a simplified procedure exists for contracts involving
products of a value less than 7,500 rubles. Upon receipt of a delivery order the buyer forwards the order to the seller, who is deemed
to have accepted it if he does not raise any objections within ten
days. If objections are raised the matter can go to A rbitrazh. 109
The third and the simplest form is used if the delivery order
contains all necessary data (e.g., quality, quantity, time for delivery). The parties named are deemed to have accepted if neither objects within ten days, and the order becomes binding on both even
103. 1959 SDP, supra note 59, at§ 72; 1959 SDG, supra note 59, at§ 12. See also State
A rbitrazh, supra note 10, at 1289.
104. 1959 SDP, supra note 59, at§ 16(1); 1959 SDG, supra note 59, at§ 12(3). See also H.
BERMAN, JUSTICE IN THE U.S.S.R., supra note 19, at 122-24.
105. State A rbitrazh, supra note 10, at 1290. See also Fal'kovich & Barash, supra note
20, at 56.
106. 1959 SDP, supra note 59, at§ 16(2); 1959 SDG, supra note 59, at§ 12(4)-(5).
107. State A rbitrazh, supra note 10, at 1298.
108. Id. at 1298-99.
109. 1959 SDP, supra note 59, §§ 10, 11, 16; 1959 SDG, supra note 59, § 11(8). See also
Loeber, supra note l, at 144.
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if no subsequent contract is concluded on the basis of the order. 110
Any objections must be communicated by the party raising them
to the agency which issued the order and to the other party. If the
objections are found to be groundless by the issuing agency, a contract should be entered into by the parties or the matter may go
to Arbitrazh. 111
Arbitrazh procedure is thus available to resolve two types of
"pre-contract" disputes. A rbitrazh procedure may be used to compel a party to conclude a contract, as well as to settle disputes over
the terms of a draft contract. Not all disputes before A rbitrazh
however are legal in character; there may, for example, be a question involving the economic expediency of a particular decision,
such as the refusal to buy unwanted goods. 112
Another important principle embodied in Soviet contract law
is that enterprises cannot plead defects in planning as a means of
avoiding contractual obligations. In Stalingrad Office v. Alchevsk
Metallurgical Plant, 113 the buyer office of the RSFSR Ferrous
Metal Sales and Supply Administration sued for a forfeit, alleging
that the seller had not completed a delivery of cast iron. The producer, a metallurgy factory in the Ukranian Republic, claimed to
be released from liability on the ground that the planning agency
(the Council of National Economy) had not allocated it enough iron.
Incomplete delivery was not, it was argued, the producer's fault.
A rbitrazh held the producer liable on the ground that it was the
producer's responsibility to ensure an adequate supply and that
underestimation by the planning agency of the producer's needs
was not sufficient grounds for release from contractual obligations.114
110. 1959 SDP, supra note 59, § 10(3); 1959 SDG, supra note 59, § 11(8). See also
Zamengof, supra note 11, at 28.
111. Loeber, supra note 1, at 144-45.
112. Id. at 146; State Arbitrazh, supra note 10, at 1292. Under art. 2 of the Statute on
State Arbitrazh Attached to the USSR Council of Ministers supra note 23, arbitrazh has a
wide range of administrative powers. Included among those powers are those associated
with "socialist legality and state discipline in the fulfillment of plan assignments and contractual obligations" (para. 3), the elimination of "shortcomings in the activity of enterprises" (para. 5) and the development of "rational economic links between enterprises"
(para. 2). Such a power is clearly aimed at providing a legal basis for arbitrazh decisions on
grounds of economic expediency. For English text of the Statute see W. BUTLER, supra note
7, at 253.
113. Loeber, supra note 1, at 148.
114. Id.
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In Bobrovsk Insu'lation Factory v. Khar'kov Factory "Elektrotyazhmash,"115 the producer could not deliver insulating
materials under a contract because the permit for its own supply
of raw materials did not cover the particular raw materials needed
to make the insulating materials required by the purchaser. State
A rbitrazh of the Council of Ministers of the U .S.S.R. criticized an
earlier pre-contract Arbitrazh decision which had compelled the
producer to enter into a contract with the buyer, and held in favor
of the producer because of special circumstances which showed
that "the failure to supply the goods occurred through no fault of
the Bobrovsk factory (the producer)." 116 It was, however, clear that
Arbitrazh was not abandoning the general principle that a supplier is not relieved from responsibility for not delivering goods
merely because it failed to receive raw materials. The exception in
this case was due to certain "special features," including the fact
that the raw materials received for one of the items were four
times less ·than the quantity required, and the fact that the buyer
had not done all it could to adapt insulatins- materials manufactured from other materials. The crucial finding in the case appears
to be that the initial supply of raw materials did not provide the
materials actually required for the production of the insulating
materials. This interpretetation of the case is supported by the
State Arbitrazh 's disapproval of the pre-contract Arbitrazh decision which compelled the producer to enter into the contract. The
case must therefore be taken as affirming not only the general
rule that inadequate allocation by planning agencies of raw materials is not a ground for release from contractual obligations, but
also that an exception to the rule may be permitted in certain narrowly defined circumstances. In the following year State Arbitrazh ruled that in case a delivery order demands delivery of
products for which raw materials are not provided, Arbitrazh
agencies may "raise the question of eliminating planning mistakes
that had been made." 117
The USSR State A rbitrazh also issues "Instructive Letters"
and "Informative Letters." The former are directed to lower Ar115. Id. at 149 n.95; H. BERMAN, Justice in the U.S.S.R., COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS supra
note 5, at 137-38
116. First reported in SOTSIALISTICHESKAIA ZAKONNOST (SOCIALIST LEGALITY) (No. 10,
1960). A more complete report later appeared in No. 12 at 77. The latter report is translated
in J. HAZARD & I. SHAPIRO, THE SOVIET LEGAL SYSTEM 127-28 (Vol. II 1962).
117. Instructive Letter of Dec. 23, 1961, 19-20 Sbornik 8 (1961), Instructive Letter of
Sept. 23, 1960, 15 id. 79; 12 id. at 7, cited in Loeber, supra note 1, at 153 n.116.
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bitrazh agencies for guidance on matters of substantive law and
procedure. The latter are answers to inquiries from enterprises.
The USSR State A rbitrazh has issued a vast body of Instructive
Letters. One such letter issued in 1958 declared that if a buyer
personally selects goods from the supplier knowing that the goods
are different from those specified in the contract, the buyer cannot later bring an action aginst the supplier for breach of
contract. 118 Another Instructive Letter states that A rbitrazh agencies are generally not allowed to free the debtor from payment of
fines or penalties, though such agencies may do so "in extraordinary cases if there are legal reasons." 119 The "legal reasons"
were not defined. In yet another Letter, State A rbitrazh ruled
that a new agreement reached between a buyer and seller to
delivery by the due date does not relieve the seller from fines and
penalties for nondelivery .120
In 1962 an Instructive Letter 121 was issued which should, in
part, solve the difficulty that arose in the Bobrov case (1960)
discussed above. In that case, it will be recalled, State A rbitrazh
criticized the solution of the pre-contract dispute by an arbitral
agency whereby the producer was compelled to enter into a contract even though its own raw materials permit did not cover the
particular raw materials needed for discharging the delivery order
which was the basis of the contract. The Instructive Letter of 1962
ruled that A rbitrazh agencies should not force parties to enter into
a contract if the delivery order does not correspond to the production plan of the supplier enterprise. 122 An argument can be made
that it should follow from this rule that a contract should not be
forced on an enterprise whose allocated raw materials do not meet
the requirements for the effective discharge .of the contract.
It is possible that in some instances a planning act may itself
be issued in violation of the procedure or plan of a higher agency.
In such instances the 1962 Letter provides that Arbitrazh may
rule that contracts should be concluded in compliance with their
respective delivery orders. In so ruling, the A rbitrazh would be
118. Letter of Jan. 16, 1958, 6 Sbornik 35 (1958), cited in Loeber, supra note 1, at 151.
119. Instructive Letter of July 22, 1950, 3 Sbornik 183 (1950), cited in Loeber, supra
note l, at 151 n.107.
120. Letter of Aug. 29, 1959, 6 Sbornik 31 (1959). See also Sots. Zak. No. 12, p. 82 (1957);
id. No. 12, p. 78 (1958), id. No. 9, p. 92 (1963), cited in Loeber, supra note 1, at 151 n.108.
121. Instructive Letter of Oct. 6, 1962, 21 Sbornik 97 (1962), cited in Loeber, supra note
1, at 152 n.115.
122. Loeber, supra note 1, at 152.
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preserving consistency between the planning act and the delivery
order. 123
Although, as pointed out above, contracts cannot be used to
correct planning errors, the State Arbitrazh has often exercised
its jurisdiction in a way that mitigates hardship arising from bad
planning. This is often done at the pre-contract stage. In one case,
a producer was ordered to deliver goods which he was to start
producing only in the following year. The planning agency, upon
advice from State Arbitrazh, freed the producer from its obligation to contract and deliver, and assigned the order to another producer .124
In Libknekht P/,ant v. Kuz'min P/,ant, 125 the producer received
a delivery order from his superior agency which exceeded his production program. He informed the other party of his refusal to
enter into a contract and also notified the superior agency as required by internal regulations. The other party sued for nondelivery and asked that a fine be imposed. A rbitrazh dismissed the suit
because the producer had not accepted the delivery order and had
informed all parties concerned of his nonacceptance. A rbitrazh
held thatthe party suing should have applied to the superior agency
for allocation of another supplier .126
The above instances show that planning errors are usually
corrected in the pre-contract stages either by decision of Arbitrazh or by informal administrative procedures. Such informal
administrative procedures are often adopted upon recommendation from A rbitrazh to a superior planning agency .127 It has also
been established that correction is possible by A rbitrazh even
after the contract has been concluded. 128
3.

CHANGE OF PLANNING ACT AND READJUSTMENT OF
LIABILITY

Correction is, of course, always possible through the issuance
of new planning acts. Upon the issuance of new planning acts, as
123. Instructive Letter of Oct. 6, 1962, 21 Sbornik 97 (1962), cited in Loeber, supra note
1, at 152 n.115.
124. Instructive Letter of Sept. 23, 1960, 15 id. at 83, cited in Loeber, supra note 1, at
153 n.118.
125. [1957] 6 Sbornik 40 Loeber, supra note l, at 153 n.119.
126. Libknekht Pl,ant v. Kuz'min Pl,ant, 6 Sbornik 49 (1957), cited in Loeber, supra note
1. at 153.
127. Instructive Letters of 1960, supra note 124; 1962, supra note 123; see text accompanying notes 122-25, supra.
128. The Bobrovsk Insulation Factory Case, cited in Loeber, supra note 1, at 149 n.95.
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indicated in the previous section, the new plan instructions are not
only to be incorporated by new agreements into existing contracts, but several Soviet writers such as Zamengof, Ioffe,
Krasnov and Mints are of the view that new plan instructions are
automatically substituted into existing contracts, even if new
agreements for their incorporation have not been concluded. 129
In the case of Warehouse of the Latvian SSR v. Penza Warehouse, 130 the supplier was under an obligation to deliver a certain
quantity of watches to the buyer. After the specifications had
been agreed upon, the All Union Chief Trade Administration
changed the delivery plan and the specifications. The parties failed
to incorporate this change into their contract, but the supplier
delivered a smaller quantity of watches in compliance with the
new plan. The buyer sued under the original contract for delivery
of the balance. State Arbitrazh dismissed the claim, holding that
insofar as the supplier had performed in compliance with the corrected plan he was not guilty of nondelivery .131 This holding suggests that new planning instructions supersede the old and are
automatically incorporated into existing contracts even without a
new agreement.
Such automatic incorporation of new planning instructions
takes place only in cases involving parties that are both under the
jurisdiction of the agency issuing the new plan. In cases involving
plan changes ordered by an authority to which only one of the contracting parties is subordinate, the change does not affect the
original contract rights of the other partner. In such cases State
A rbitrazh emphasizes the duty of the planning agency to assign a
new buyer to the other party to the contract. For example, the
State A rbitrazh Instructive Letter of February 18, 1959 describes
a case in which the supplier delivered goods to wholesale warehouses of the RSFSR Trade Administration, which at the request
of its warehouses unilaterally changed the quantity of goods to be
delivered. Arbitrazh ruled that the RSFSR Trade Administration
was obliged to inform the supplier of other buyers willing to purchase the balance. 132
129. Zamengof, supra note 11, at 30-31 n.22. See also Loeber, supra note 1, at 155; Instructive Letter, July 6, 1955, 3 Sbornik 194, cited in Loeber, supra note l, at 126 n.132.
130. 14 Sbornik 58 (1960).
131. Id.
132. Instructive Letter of Feb. 18, 1959, 9 Sbornik 19 (1959).
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If, however, the superior agency of the party ordering the
change of a planning act seeks and reaches agreement with the superior agency of the other contracting party, the change of plan
becomes binding on both parties. 133 In Novo-Kramatorskiy Machine-Building Plant v. Izhorskiy Plant, 134 the seller contracted to
deliver three sets of equipment to the buyer. Two more sets were
ordered by the superior agency of the buyer, and the buyer was
informed of the new order by the seller. The buyer refused to accept delivery of the two additional sets. The seller sued for
recovery of his costs, for which A rbitrazh held the buyer liable. 135
The rule allowing a party to reject delivery orders within ten
days 136 also applies to plan changes affecting contracts that are
concluded by the mere acceptance of a delivery order. In such
cases, a plan change is deemed to be accepted by the parties if
neither raises objections or demands an additional agreement
within ten days. 137 Zamengof asserts that the cancellation or
amendment of a plan assignment on the basis of which a contract
has been concluded would automatically involve cancellation or a
corresponding amendment of the obligation itself. 138
Moreover, if account be taken of the shortcomings that still exist
in the day-to-day functioning of the planning agencies, as a consequence of which changes in plans are not always transmitted to
economic organizations in ample time and simultaneously to all
concerned, and the very notifications of such changes so often
contain inaccuracies and uncoordinated elements, the achievement of su:ch agreement is highly desirable for purposes of defining mutual rights and obligations of the parties and for rendering
their relations precise and definite .... However, in actuality
what happens here is not cancellation or amendment of the contract in the true sense of the word, but merely a correction in the
text of the plan assignments incorporated into the contract, or
else a recording of the fact that the obligations have been cancelled and the contract has lost its force as a consequence of the
changes which these instructions have undergone and which are
obligatory for the parties regardless of whether they enter the
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Loeber, supra note 1, at 157.
6 Sbornik 38 (1957).
See State Arbitrazh, supra note 10, at 1295-96.
1959 SDP, supra note 59, § 10; 1959 SDG, supra note 59, § 12.
Instructive Letter of Dec. 18, 1962, § 11, 22 Sbornik 12-15 (1962).
Zamengof, supra note 11, at 30.
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corresponding changes into the wording of the contract.
Therefore, even if no such changes are entered, the content of
the obligations will be determined by the new plan assignment,
and not by the instructions reproduced in the contract. 139

If this is the correct view, and it is a view which is supported
by other Soviet writers, 140 as well as by State A rbitrazh practice,
it should follow that a new planning act, if it effects a major
change, may require complete dissolution of existing contracts. In
such cases Loeber is of the view that the old contract must be
treated as having been rescinded, a party disagreeing with such a
result being free to seek a decision of A rbitrazh .141 Neither the
1961 Principles nor the 1959 and 1969 Statutes on Deliveries make
any provision regarding the dissolution of contracts. Zamengof
has cited two unpublished cases, however, showing that A rbitrazh
supports the principle that new planning acts can lead to automatic termination of old contracts. 142 This must be understood to
imply a simultaneous substitution of a new agreement in accordance with the new plan even if no new agreement has been concluded. The Myshega Armature Works 143 case and the case concerning the Warehouse of the Latvian SSR 144 are additional cases
confirming the view that State Arbitrazh practice favors this principle.
In practice, if the new planning act requires dissolution of
contract, it raises the question of whether the party urging
dissolution is liable to pay a fine or penalty to the other party for
nonperformance. In a 1962 case 145 it was held that a change in plan
frees the customer from fines, although in Loeber's view the
tendency is to subject that party whose superior agency issued
the new planning act to a fine. For example, in a 1948 case 146 the

139. Id. at 31.
140. loffe, Mints, and Krasnov; see text accompanying note 129, supra.
141. Loeber, supra note 1, at 162.
142. Zamengof, supra note 11, at 34-35 nn.23-24.
143. See text accompanying note 67, supra.
144. See text accompanying note 130, supra.
145. SOTSIALISTICHESKAIA ZAKONNOST (SOCIALIST LEGALITY) 92 (No. 11, 1962).
146. Isanora, Nekotoryye voprosy vliyaniya aklov planirovaniya na izmeneniye i prekrashcheniye dogovora postavki (Some Questions of the Impact of Planning Acts on Arbitration and Cessation of a Contract of Delivery) in VYuZI, VOPROSY SOVETSKOGO GRAZHDANSKOGO PRAVA (QUESTIONS OF SOVIET CIVIL LAW) 58-61 (Moscow 1955), cited in Loeber, supra
note 1, at 163 n.163.
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supplier delivered certain products to the purchaser, a factory
subordinate to the Ministry of Transport-Machine Building, in
compliance with the Ministry's orders. The purchaser refused payment on the grounds that prior to delivery the purchaser had
become subordinate to another ministry, which changed the purchaser's industrial profile in such a way that the purchaser now no
longer needed the products. The purchaser argued that upon
becoming subject to the other ministry's jurisdiction, it (i.e., the
purchaser factory) had requested that its previous ministry not to
effect delivery. State Arbitrazh, however, held the factory liable
to pay the purchase price. 147
It seems that this principle is applicable only in cases where
loss is as a result of a new pl,anning act. In other cases it would
seem that the following general rule embodied in article 37 of the
1961 principles applies: "[A] person who has not executed an
obligation ... shall be financially liable [Article 36 of the present
Fundamental Principles] only if there is fault [intention or
negligence] ...." 148
Article 36 of the Principles appears to support the proposition
that the above exception is applicable only in cases where loss
arises as a result of a new planning act. Article 36 provides that
"losses caused by improper performance shall not release the debtor from specific execution of the obligation, except for instances
when a planning task on which the obligation between socialist
organizations is based has lost force." 149 Thus for example, if a supplier is unable to meet his contractual obligation to deliver a certain product because his production plan is altered by a planning
order of a superior agency to whose jurisdiction the producer has
been newly subjected, the producer may be subject to a fine for
non-delivery under the principle of the 1948 case cited above.
Under Article 36, however, the producer would be exempt from
specific performance ("specific execution of the obligation")
147. Isanora, supra note 146, at 61, cited in Loeber, supra note 1, at 163-64.
148. Art. 37, para. 1 of the 1961 Principles, supra note 29. "Person" here includes the
enterprise as a legal person. See State Arbitrazh, supra note 10, at 1309. If an individual
manager appears responsible for a breach, Arbitrazh may refer him to the Procurator
General for possible criminal sanctions. Procedure for Forwarding to Agencies of the Procurator General Instances of Delivery of Incomplete Products (1964), id. at nn.9,128. See
also Zile, supra note 6, at 219, 239-40.
149. This principle is also expressed in 1959 SDP, supra note 59, § 80, and 1959 SDG,
supra note 59, § 81.
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because the old plan, i.e., the source of the obligation, would have
"lost force."
A second exception to the general rule that liability arises
solely through fault is the principle that defects in planning cannot
serve as a release from contractual obligations. In Moscow Woolen
Base v. Troitksy Cloth Factory, 150 the purchaser sued for damages
resl:llting from the nondelivery of cloth. The supplier's defense
was that its superior did not allocate sufficient raw materials to
enable the supplier to fulfill its contract with the purchaser. State
Arbitrazh held the supplier liable on the ground that the absence
of raw materials does not serve to relieve a supplier from liability
unless the supplier shows that it had done all that it could to
secure materials from the superior. In Stalingrad Office v. A lchevsk
Metallurgical Plant, 151 the buyer brought an action on the incomplete delivery of cast iron. The producer's defense was that its
Council of National Economy did not allocate the producer enough
fondy. Arbitrazh held the producer liable because it was the latter's responsibility to see to it that the producer was supplied
with adequate fondy.
Berman observes that "[d]espite the general requirement that
there is no liability for breach of contract without fault, the failure
of the supplier's own sources of supply is not considered to be a
valid excuse for his nonperformance; in such cases a fictitious fault
is assumed to exist." 152 Loeber makes the following comment on
the stated exception:
It seems harsh to hold a producer liable for nonperformance if
his requests for necessary materials were not acted upon by
planning agencies. But to decide otherwise would allow producers to use shortcomings of planning authorities as a welcome
excuse for their own failures ... and to rely passively on the
mechanism of planning. 153

To minimize the liability of enterprises for planning errors of
superior agencies and to encourage efficient planning, a radical
proposal has been made. It has been suggested by one Soviet
writer that enterprises be given the right to challenge planning
150. 11 Sov. IusT. 31 (1966); see also State Arbitrazh, supra note 10, at 1292.
151. Note 113, supra.
152. H. BERMAN, JUSTICE IN THE U.S.S.R., supra note 19, at 136.
153. Loeber, supra note 1, at 148. See Stalingrad case, supra note 113; cf. Bobrovsk Insu'lation Factory v. Khar'kov, cited in Loeber, supra note 1, at 149 n.95.
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acts before State Arbitrazh. 154 It is presently impossible for an
enterprise to challenge or even "sue" a superior agency before Arbitrazh. An enterprise may not, for example, sue to rescind an unrealistic delivery order or to recover damages from a superior
agency for failure to supply it with the raw materials necessary
for the fulfillment of the enterprise's contractual obligations. Currently such disputes are settled by administrative instructions,
and such contractual relationships are treated as matters of administrative law rather than matters governed by the civil law of
obligations. 155
Some have argued that ever since enterprises have been conferred the right to refuse to conclude contracts for the delivery of
unwanted goods, 156 State Arbitrazh has had a right to refuse to
compel such enterprises to enter into contracts that do not correspond with the economic activity of those enterprises. 157 This argument has been accepted by The Institute of Government and Law
of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, which has asserted
that to deny this right to enterprises "would be to nullify the independence of the contracting enterprises ...." 158
The other circumstance in which specific performance is not
compulsory is not connected with . new planning acts, but may be
mentioned here for the sake of completeness. This involves .instances in which one party is allowed to rescind a contract in the
event of a unilateral breach by the other. In Moscow Office v.
Power Institute, 159 the producer was ordered to deliver pipes to
the purchaser by February 1958. The producer was not able to fulfill the order in time. In March 1958 the purchaser notified the producer that, in view of the delay, he had managed without pipes.
Despite such notification the producer delivered the pipes in May
1958. Arbitrazh held that the purchaser was entitled to refuse acceptance of the pipes because the delivery of those pipes was
delayed.
154. Kleyn, Arbitration and the Consolidation of Legality in the National Economy,
U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, U.S.S.R. ECONOMY AND INDUSTRY, GENERAL INFORMATION 1, 12
(Pub. No. 42, 813, trans. Joint Publications Research Service, 1967).
155. Loeber, supra note l, at 152-54.
156. See text accompanying notes 62 and 85, supra.
157. Kleyn, supra note 154.
158. Institute of Government and Law, quoted in State Arbitrazh, supra note 10, at
1309.
159. 8 Sbornik 47 (1958); see also Loeber, supra note 1, at 160 n.148.
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Contract and P/,an Under the 1969 Statutes

In 1965 the Central Committee of the CPSU and the USSR
Council of Ministers introduced a program of economic reform designed to stimulate Soviet enterprises to meet demands for a variety of high quality goods. Resolutions adopted by those bodies
began a movement toward the decentralization of planning and
granted individual enterprises greater freedom of action in the
production and distribution of their own goods. In a major policy
shift it was directed that the individual contract rather than the
centralized plan was to become the basic document determining
the rights and obligations of suppliers and purchasers in the
delivery of all types of goods. 160 To implement this directive in
1969 Statutes on Deliveries of Producer and Consumer Goods
were passed.
1.

THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE CHANGE

The movement a way from central planning and the conferring of greater operational autonomy on enterprises did not, on the
whole, introduce very drastic changes. Still less can the new
Statutes be interpreted as a return to a free market. The most important changes are outlined below and the extent of their departure from the pre-1969 Statutes will be noted.
Under the old system the supremacy of plan and the subordination of contract to plan was beyond question. In fact, delivery of
goods could be carried out even without the conclusion of any contract.161 The purpose of the new statutes is to provide for a combination of centralized state planning with broad economic initiatives for individual enterprises. The statutes were designed to
develop rational economic ties between enterprises, promote the
further development of economic accountability, heighten the role
of the delivery contract in the national economy, and intensify the
mutual material responsibility of enterprises. 162
The feature which is novel in the 1969 legislation is contained
in the Statute on Deliveries of Consumer Goods. 163 The Statute on
Deliveries of Consumer Goods permits contracts to be concluded
160. Resolution of the C.C. of the CPSU and the USSR Council of Ministers, Oct. 4,
1965, Res. 4/10/65, § 10(1) (1965).
161. See text accompanying notes 60 and 61, supra; 1959 SDP, supra note 59, § 5(3);
1959 SDG, supra note 59, § 6(4).
162. 1969 SDP, supra note 42, § 1; 1969 SDG, supra note 42, § 1.
163. 1969 SDG, supra note 42, §§ 8(1), 6(2).
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on the basis of a purchaser's order to a supplier prior to the issuance of planning acts. In this way, the contract is regarded as an
instrument not for ending the planning process but for beginning
it. The individual supplier's production plan, on the basis of which
the state production plan is drafted, is therefore itself based on the
contracts it has concluded.
Before an enterprise contracts with another, however, it must
first be "attached" to that enterprise by a "plan of attachment" of
a superior agency. Upon notification of attachment the parties
may enter into contractual relations. The notification of attachment includes a specification of the overall volume and assortment
of goods to be delivered during the year .164 The specifications comply with the long-range plan for the development of the national
economy. With the information in the notice of attachment, the
purchaser presents its order to the supplier, specifying the
desired goods by name, type, etc., as well as their quality, quantity and the time period for delivery .165 The order becomes a contract for delivery upon acceptance in writing by the supplier .166
As for producer goods, the 1969 Statute on Deliveries of Producer Goods retains with some modification the old system under
which contractual relations between supplier and purchaser are
established; i.e. , contracts are concluded after the issuance of a
nariad. The purchaser, however, has an unrestricted right to
refuse to enter into the contract, and the supplier can do the same
if he believes that the nariad does not conform to the production
plan. The issuing agency must decide the matter within ten days
of notification of the refusal. If that agency fails to make a ruling
within ten days it is deemed to have accepted the refusal. 167 The
matter can ultimately go to A rbitrazh. Either party can take the
initiative to seek an A rbitrazh decision, 168 unlike the old system
under which it was the supplier's responsibility to submit a precontract dispute to A rbitrazh.
It will be recalled that, even prior to 1969, under Point 8 of
the 1962 Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers, 169 enterprises
164. 1969 SDG, supra note 42, § 8(1).
165. Id.,§ 9(2).
166. Id., § 13(1)(a).
167. 1969 SDP, supra note 42, §§ 9(3), 13(1)-(2).
168. Id.,§ 26(4); 1969 SDG, supra note 42, § 22(4).
169. Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, "On Further Improvement of the
Procedure for Conclusion of Contracts of Delivery of Equipment and Materials for the Use
of Enterprises and Organizations," June 30, 1962, 5 RESHENIIA PARTII PRAVITEL'STVA PO
KHOZIAISTVENNYM VOPROSAM 1917-67 gg., 658 at 127 (Moscow 1968).
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had the right to refuse to sign contracts for the supply of unwanted goods. Under both the 1962 Decree and the new statutes,
the period for refusal is ten days. Furthermore, in the pre-1969
period, A rbitrazh could relieve a party of the obligation to take
delivery on grounds of "economic expediency ." 110
As pointed out above, the purchaser's right to refuse was exercisable under the old system for "superfluous" or unneeded
goods. Under the 1969 Statute on Deliveries of Producer Goods
such qualifying adjectives have been omitted. Speer regards such
omission as conferring an unrestricted right of refusal. 171 The 1969
Statute on Consumer Goods, however, retains the words "superfluous" and "unneeded." It seems anomalous that a wider right
should be conferred with respect to producer goods when in fact it
is the Statute on Deliveries of Consumer Goods which seeks to
confer greater operational autonomy on enterprises than the Statute on Deliveries of Producer Goods. It seems better to view the
post-1969 law as introducing no change from the previous system,
under which State Arbitrazh practice suggests that regardless of
words such as "superfluous" or "unneeded," the purchaser has an
unfettered discretion to reject such goods.
Under the new Statutes a nari"ad "accepted for execution" can
itself acquire the force of a contract without the need for a new
agreement. 112 Just as under the pre-1969 Statutes, nariady accepted and executed before the conclusion of a contract, or planning acts defining all the details of the contract, could automatically
be substituted to govern the rights and duties of the parties concerned regardless of the existence or nonexistence of a contract
between them. 173 Under the 1969 legislation, however, either party
may now require that the contract formed through acceptance of a
nariad be formalized by a separate contract between the parties. 174
The supremacy of plan over contract in these questions, therefore,
remains unaffected.
Further evidence of the supremacy of plan over contract can
be found in the provisions concerning the amendment and dissolution of contracts in the light of planning acts. If a contract is con170.
at 527.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Zamengof, supra note 11, at 29; Loeber, supra note 1, at 146; Speer, supra note 9,
Speer, supra note 9, at 528.
1969 SDP, supra note 42, §§ 19(b), 24(1); 1969 SDG, supra note 42, § 20(1), (2).
See text accompanying notes 59-61, supra.
1969 SDP, supra note 42, § 24(3); 1969 SDG, supra note 42, § 20(3).
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eluded prior to the issuance of the plan and the details of a subsequently issued plan require an amendment or dissolution of the
contract, such amendment or dissolution must be formalized in
writing in a supplementary agreement signed by both parties. 175
This applies to all contracts, including those contracts involving
consumer goods, concluded prior to the issuance of planning acts.
Not only does this legislation reaffirm the old principle that
changes in planning acts require corresponding modifications in
and, if necessary, dissolution of existing contracts, 176 but this
legislation also reflects the ultimate supremacy of the plan. The
view that was dominant among Soviet as well as Western writers
before 1969, 177 that failure to incorporate necessary changes in contracts leads to the automatic substitution of the relevant provisions of the new planning act, would therefore still apply. The
Arbitrazh practice holding that party whose superior agency
issued the new plan responsible for loss arising from such change
would likewise still apply .118
In Armatura v. Benzostroi, the plaintiff, pursuant to a contract, sold ventilators and cranes to the defendant in 1934. In
November of the same year the defendant gave the plaintiff an application for the purchase of more of the same products in 1935.
The plaintiff subsequently manufactured the products, but the defendant refused to execute a contract because its fund for 1935
had been reduced. In the lawsuit that resulted, A rbitrazh held
that "an application regarding requirements for the following year
is a document subject to be corrected and made detailed ... by
planning and regulating organs and cannot be viewed as creating
an obligation in the maker ... to accept and pay for the product
mentioned in the application." 179 The principle thus embodied in
A rmatura is that existing contracts must be modified to reflect
subsequent changes in plans. But this principle may similarly apply
to post-1969 cases if, for example, a nariad for producer goods is at
variance with a pre-contract arrangement between two enter175. 1969 SDP, supra note 42, §§ 26(3), 27(4); 1969 SDG, supra note 42, § 22(3), 23(4).
176. See Section Ill, C, supra.
177. Zamengof, supra note 11, at 30; Dozortsev, id., at 34 n.22; Loeber, supra note 1, at
155, 159; and loffe, id., at 155 n.128.
178. See text accompanying notes 145-46, supra.
179. Armatura v. Bezostroi, Shkundin, Pl.anned Task and Contractual Obligation,
SOVIET STATE AND LAW 84-85 (No. 7, in Russian, 1940), cited in Berman, Commerical Contracts, supra note 5, at 225-26, Case 1.
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prises, or if a new planning act is issued modifying relevant specifications.
Speer argues that a purchaser's order to a supplier constitutes an "offer" under the 1969 Statutes, but that such an order
under the pre-1969 Statutes was not an "offer" but a "pre-plan
contract through which an individual enterprise's projected production plan for the forthcoming year could be drafted and the
state production plan drawn up." 180 Since the contract could be
drawn up only after the issuance of the plan, the purchaser's order
could not, in his opinion, be an "offer." This, however, is not of
much practical significance for three reasons. Firstly, even in the
pre-1969 period there was a widespread practice showing purchasers and suppliers concluding contracts prior to the issuance of
nariady by simply referring to the as yet unissued nariad as the
indicator of the contract terms. 181 Secondly, as pointed out by Berman, Bratus and Alekseev, the plans of superior agencies were, in
practice, concluded in the light of draft plans and requests submitted to them by lower enterprises. 182 Thirdly, Speer himself points
out that a purchaser's pre-plan order "did have the essential
characteristics of an 'offer,' which, if accepted, bound purchaser
and supplier to conclude a corresponding contract if the plan,
when issued, so permitted." 183 Speer further points out that this
was often supported by Arbitrazh practice. Speer thus stipulates.
two additional conditions for his "offer": acceptance, and permission by plan. One may justifiably ask whether Speer is not confusing the concept of offer with that of the contract itself. It would indeed be a novel definition which asserts than an offer is only an
"offer" after it ha~ been "accepted."
For these reasons the argument that under the 1969 Statutes
a purchaser's order is an "offer," while under the previous statutes
it was a "pre-plan contract" is really academic. Legal niceties such
as the distinction between an "offer" and a "pre-plan contract" did
not affect the actual freedom enjoyed under the old statutes. It
must, however, be pointed out that under the previous statutes
the supplier could ignore a pre-plan purchaser's order, while under
180. Speer, supra note 9, at 522.
181. Id. at 520.
182. H. BERMAN, JUSTICE IN THE U.S.S.R., supra note 19, at 139-40; Bratus & Alekseev,
supra note 69, at 26; see also notes 69-72, supra, and accompanying text.
183. Speer, supra note 9, at 522-23.
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the 1969 Statutes the supplier must reply to the order, either by
accepting the order or by sending to the purchaser a draft contract setting forth its own terms. 184 This procedure is similar to
the process of filing a protocol of disagreement under the old
statutes. 185
It must also be emphasized that in concluding a pre-plan delivery contract under the present law the parties have considerably
greater freedom in establishing their contract terms than they enjoyed previously. Guided by the overall volume of goods projected
for production and distribution in the forthcoming year and the
long-range plan for the development of the national economy, the
parties determine the quantity of goods to be delivered, the detailed assortment of the goods, and the time of their delivery .186
Free agreement as to such details and other contractual terms is
always subject to conformity with the plan when it is issued. Any
discrepancy between the contract and the plan must be rectified
by modification of the contract. 187
With regard to the disposal of non-plan goods, the pre-1969
law allowed a party to sell such goods to any purchaser independently of any planning agency. If the parties could not agree on the
terms, the matter had to go Arbitrazh which, in effect, involved
the intervention by a state agency (i.e., Arbitrazh) though not the
regular planning agency. 188 Under the 1969 Statutes a dispute between a prospective supplier and prospective purchaser over the
terms of a contract for delivery of non-plan goods can be submitted to Arbitrazh for resolution only if the parties have agreed on
the essential terms of the contract. 189
2.

DEFECTIVE DELIVERIES AND FINES

No drastic changes have been introduced by the 1969
Statutes regarding the quality and completeness of goods delivered. Under the old regime the parties could stipulate a quality
that was higher than that required by State Standards or Technical Conditions. 190 If the goods delivered did not meet the stipu184. 1969 SOP, supra note 42, § 22(4); i969 SOG, supra note 42, § 18(1).
185. 1959 SOP, supra note 59, § 16(1); 1959 SOG, supra note 59, § 12(3).
186. 1969 SOP, supra note 42.~ § 6(1), 27(1), (2), (6), 29(1); 1969 SOG, supra note 42, §§
6(2), 23(1)(2), 24(1), 26(1).
187. Speer, supra note 9, at 523.
188. Id. at 529-30.
189. 1969 SOP, supra note 42, § 23(2); 1969 SOG, supra note 42, § 19(2).
190. 1959 SOP, supra note 59, § 36(1); 1959 SOG, supra note 59, § 33(1); Speer, supra
note 9, at 532.
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lated higher standards, and met only the State Standard, the purchaser could either reject the goods or pay for them without the
stipulated surcharge (i.e., the charge in excess of that appearing in
the price list). 191 Under the new Statutes, if goods delivered meet
only the State conditions and fail to meet the higher stipulated
conditions, the purchaser has the same options previously available.192 The 1969 Statutes provide, however, that any fine imposed
for defective delivery is to be stipulated by the parties themselves,193 whereas the previous statutes made no provision whatsoever for the imposition of fines for defective delivery. This
lacuna was, however, filled by the State Arbitrazh, which ruled
that in such cases the fine would be the same as that specified for
delivery of goods not conforming to State Standards if the parties
had so specified. 194 The parties may now stipulate fines beyond
those specified in the State Standards. 195 This reflects the growing
official concern over the large number of contractual disputes involving defects in quality. Over twenty percent of A rbitrazh cases
involve complaints over quality .196 The increased freedom of parties to provide for higher fines is therefore an attempt to promote
improvement in quality.
If the goods delivered do not conform to State Standards or
Technical Conditions the purchaser, under both the previous as
well as the new Statutes, has a duty to refuse to accept or pay for
the goods and to bring suit to exact a fine from the supplier. 197 The
prohibition against the granting of "amnesty" 198 still applies. In a
1962 ruling State Arbitrazh declared that an agreement between
the supplier and purchaser under which the supplier was to
replace defective goods at no extra charge and without the return
to the supplier of the goods oridinally delivered, could not relieve
191. RSFSR CIVIL CODE of 1964, art. 160, para.4. For an English translation see W.
GRAY & R. STULTS, CIVIL CODE OF THE RSFSR (1965). Under the 1959 Statutes the purchaser
had the right to refuse goods as unordered. 1959 SDP, supra note 59, § 54(1)(a); 1959 SDG,
supra note 59, § 52(1)(a).
192. 1959 SDP, supra note 59, § 63(1); 1959 SDG, supra note 59, § 64(1).
193. 1969 SDP, supra note 42, § 63(2); 1969 SDG, supra note 42, § 64(2).
194. Instructive Letter of July 31, 1963, No 1-1-37, 25 Sbornik 42, 45 (1966) cited by
Speer, supra note 9, at 533, n.121.
195. 1969 SDP, supra note 42, § 47(7); 1969 SDG, supra note 42, § 47(7).
196. State A rbitrazh, supra note 10, at 1299.
197. RSFSR CIVIL CODE of 1964, art. 261; see also Zile, supra note 6, at 239; and Liberman, supra note 31, at 48.
198. See text accompanying notes 93-97, supra,
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the supplier of his liability to pay the stipulated fine for the
delivery of defective goods. 199 This rule remains unchanged, and if
an attempt is made by one party to protect the other from the imposition of a fine, Arbitrazh may, upon discovery, direct that the
mandated fine be paid to the USSR. Treasury instead of to the
party normally entitled to that fine. 200 The prohibition placed upon
the waived fines applies to all contracts and thus is not confined to
those involving defective delivery. Thus, although enterprises
have been given greater powers to stipulate higher fines for the
nonfulfillment of contractual obligations, those enterprises have
no corresponding freedom to waive fines. 201
One way in which a buyer can protect himself from the
seller's charge that a delivery was in fulfillment of contractual
obligations and that the buyer's refusal to accept the goods delivered was a unilateral breach is by promptly filing a Protocol of
Disagreement. This issue has already been discussed in a previous
section and will therefore not be discussed here. 202 Also discussed
elsewhere is the question of nonconforming delivery (i.e., delivery
at variance with the contract) as a result of changes in plan. 203 The
1969 legislation does not affect the principles discussed under
those heads.
Another relevant issue is the compensatory nature of fines.
Both the pre-1969 Statute and the 1969 Statutes stipulate that'if a
fine paid by one party for breach of a contractual obligation does
not equal the other party's losses, then the party in breach must
reimburse the other for the amount of loss not met by the fine. 204
As pointed out above, 205 however, Article 37 of the 1961 Principles
specifies that the nonfulfillment of the contractual obligation must
be due to the actual fault of the party in breach if liability is to be
imposed. Thus, when the liability of a party is due to a statutory
fine, fault is presumed. But if a party sues for a loss that is not
199. Instructive Letter of Mar. 29, 1962, No. 1-1-9, 19-20 Sbornik 11, 14 (1962) cited by
Speer, supra note 9, at 535, n.132.
200. Speer, supra note 9, at 535.
201. 1969 SDP, supra note 42, § 85(3), (4); 1969 SDG, supra note 42, § 87(2)-(7).
202. See text accompanying notes 104-107, supra; in particular see Pavlodarsky Tractor Factory v. "Armmashsnabsbita," text accompanying notes 107-108, supra.
203. See Section C, 3, supra.
204. 1959 SDP, supra note 59, § 80(i); 1959 SDG, supra note 59, § 81(1); 1969 SDP, supra
note 42, § 88(1); 1969 SDG, supra note 42, § 90(1).
205. See text accompanying note 148, supra.
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covered by a fine, the other party may escape liability only by
showing that the breach of the contract terms was not occasioned
by his own fault. It has already been suggested above that this
general rule admits exceptions in two cases. Firstly, when new
planning acts have been issued and make performance impossible,
that party whose superior agency issued the act will be held
responsible for the loss regardless of fault. 206 The second exception
is the rule that defects in planning cannot be pleaded as a defense
in a suit for nonperformance or defective delivery. 201
Finally, it may be observed that an important element of contracts between Soviet business enterprises is the penalty clause. If
the parties fail to insert such a clause it will be supplied by A rbitrazh when it is asked to decide a dispute arising from the
contract. 208 Thus, enforcement and penalties are to be worked out
primarily through horizontal contractual relationships. If, however,
the parties fail to provide for such enforcement and penalties, avertical duty from a higher agency (e.g., Arbitrazh) can always be imposed.209 This reflects the well-established principle that the enforcement of fines is not only the right of the injured party but also a
duty of the State. 210
This vertical duty is operative even when a party against
whom the fine is to be imposed can show that the other party has
also violated the law. For example, a supplier who has made substandard delivery cannot escape liability even if he can prove that
the purchaser failed to return the goods or has accepted a replacement of the goods. In such a situation the vertical duty operates against both parties; not only is the supplier fined but the fine
may be made payable in whole or in part to the Union budget instead of to the purchaser. In this way both parties are punished. 211
In some cases the acts of the purchaser may diminish or even extinguish the liability of the supplier. For example, the purchaser
206. See text accompanying notes 145-48, supra.
207. See text accompanying note 150, supra.
208. Instructive Letter of the State Arbitration Agency of the USSR Council of Ministers, Mar. 29, 1964, cited in Liberman, supra note 31, at 48. In Orsk-Khalilovo Iron & Steel
Combine v. Chirchik Electrical Machinery, id. at 49, State A rbitrazh imposed a fine for incomplete delivery to the extent of 15 percent of the value of the incomplete set of deliveries.
209. Chelyabinsk Office of "Rosbakalei" v. Uvorovsky Sugar P/,ant, 18 Sov. IusT. 31,
(1967), cited in State Arbitrazh, supra note 10, at 1299-1300.
210. See text accompanying note 98, supra.
211. Liberman, supra note 31, at 51; Fal'kovich & Barash, supra note 20, at 58.
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may store perishable goods in such a way as to hasten their deterioration or he may do other acts that make it impossible to determine whether the supplier sent substandard goods. In all such
cases the 1969 Statutes do not affect Article 37 of the Principles of
Civil Legislation which allows arbitration agencies to reduce the
liability of the supplier or to completely exonerate him. Also unaffected by the 1969 Statutes is Arbitrazh power to levy costs
against the party bringing suit if the party bringing suit violated
any law concerning the delivery and acceptance of products, the initiation of the suit, etc. 212 Costs usually consist of a government fee
payable for each suit and payment to experts, if any were called. 213

E.

Conclusion

Contracts in the Soviet Union have a dual function. They
serve as a mechanism for the centralized regulation of the economy as well as serving to provide some means through which individual economic enterprises may exercise initiative. It appears
preferable to view the institution of contract as a planimplementing mechanism rather than as a legal device through
which enterprises can escape and exercise a function independently
of the plan. Contracts implement the plan to the last detail by
creating legal obligations between enterprises, and provide a mechanism for the imposition of fines for the nonperformance of plan
tasks. As Loeber observes:
[C]ontracts-and only contracts-create those reciprocal and
equivalent relations which characterize money-commodity exchanges between equal economic partners. This element of reciprocity so essential to any economic activity and initiative is missing
the sphere of planning .... To inject spontaneity into the working of
a planned economy ... contracts ... were introduced .... They are
considered to be the optimum means for linking the principles of
planning with the principles of economic rationality .214

It is of course true that since the early 1950's the trend has
been toward contractual independence, and the 1965 and 1969
reforms mark the culmination of this trend. Yet these reforms
have been introduced to minimize or to reduce the rigid bureau212. Fal'kovich & Barash, supra note 20, at 62.
213. Points 42, 44 and 45 of the 1963 Rules, supra note 26.
214. Loeber, supra note 1, at 165.
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cratization of economic control, and at the same time to facilitate
plan implementation.
The institution of A rbitrazh is, in many ways, an ingenious
device that serves as watchdog over the plan-implementing process. Having such powers as the power to go beyond the claims of
the parties, to grant relief or levy fines that may not have been
sought, to add or sever a party, to initiate suits, and to settle
disputes as part of its public function of day-to-day economic
administration gives the institution something more than a purely
judicial role in the regulation of the socialist economy. The judicial
aspect of its function has led to the establishment of a vast body of
case law which has had the welcome effect of introducing stability
and predictability after the havoc caused during the post-1917
years by attempts to regulate the economy without contracts. The
devices of Instructive Letters and Informative letters may be
regarded as judicially guided administrative instructions which
serve the same end. In this way Arbitrazh-made law has made important contributions to such vital fields of contract law as improper performance, change of contract terms vis-a-vis changes in
planning acts, dissolution of contracts, defective delivery, and the
imposition of fines.
It is primarily the work of the institution of A rbitrazh that
has molded for contracts the role of a plan-implementing mechanism. Its power to resolve what are known as "pre-contract"
disputes embodies a doctrine that rights and duties can arise prior
to the conclusion of contracts and can, for this reason, be the subject of pre-contract litigation. This theory leads to the conclusion
that the ultimate source, or the "Grundnorm" to use Kelsenian
terminology, of these rights and duties is the plan.
Furthermore, it appears that the fewer the number of plan indicators, the greater is the leeway for contractual negotiation and
maneuvering between individual enterprises. Such leeway may,
however, increase the number of pre-contract disputes because
those items previously governed by plan indicators have to be
resolved by the parties. It can be seen therefore that not only is
the plan the source of pre-contract obligations, but the greater the
scope for pre-contract negotiation the greater the degree of independence and initiative at the individual enterprise level. The
conferring of juridical personality on the economic enterprise and
the introduction of the principle of economic accountability as the
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basis of its operations would seem to be a natural extension of the
principle of operative independence. A future development, further strengthening this independence, may well be the creation of
a right on the part of a subordinate enterprise to sue a superior
agency for errors in planning, or to challenge the validity of particular planning acts. Alternatively, A rbitrazh power to join or
sever a party may be extended so as to enable i_t to join a superior
agency of one of the subordinate enterprises party to the case
before it, and to render an award against the agency rather than
its subordinate enterprise.
The foregoing presupposes the creation of procedural safeguards for the unfettered freedom of enterprises to initiate suits.
As suggested above, procedural safeguards are weak even in
those areas where statutory rights have been conferred on enterprises.

/IL PART II:
FOREIGN TRADE AND THE PLANNED ECONOMY
This part will examine the place of foreign trade within the
planned economy. Specifically, it is intended to examine the legal
and institutional framework for the conduct of foreign trade by
the Soviet Union, the relationship between foreign trade and
domestic industry, and the resolution of contractual disputes between Soviet foreign trade agencies and foreign businessmen.
This part will finally examine the legal aspects of East-West joint
ventures in the Soviet Union within the context of the plan.

A.

The Legal and Institutional Framework-An Overview

External business relations for the Soviet Union are based on
the fundamental principle of state monopoly of foreign trade, first
proclaimed in 1918 by the Decree on the Nationalization of
Foreign Trade. 215 Article 1 of the Decree provides, in part, that
transactions for the purchase or sale of any product with foreign
states or individual trading enterprises shall be carried out in the
name of the Russian Republic by specially authorized agencies.
215. Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of April 22, 1918, "On the Nationalisation of Foreign Trade." Reprinted in J. QUIGLEY, THE SOVIET FOREIGN TaADE MONOPOLY:
INSTITUTIONS AND LAWS, 202 App. B (1974). See generally, H. Berman & G. Bustin, The
Soviet System of Foreign Trade in BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS WITH THE U.S.S.R. 25 (R. Starr
ed. 1975).
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The concept of monopoly was reiterated in 1922 by another
decree 216 and then again in 1925 by a resolution 211 adopted by the
Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
The resolution provided in part that the essence of the foreign
trade monopoly:
[i]s that the State itself carries out management of foreign trade ...
establishes which organizations may carry out actual foreign
trade operations in which branches and in what volume; determines working toward the goals of improving the economy ... by
means of an export-import plan, what and in what quantities may
be exported from the country and what may be imported into it;
and it directly regulates import and export and the operations of
foreign trade organizations through a system of licenses and
quotas. 218

The agency in which the monopoly is vested and which is
responsible for the overall coordination of Soviet foreign trade is
the Ministry of Foreign Trade. The Ministry was created solely
for this purpose in 1953. 219
In the years immediately following its creation, the foreign
trade monopoly of the Ministry of Foreign Trade was extensive.
However, during the period of decentralization following the
death of Stalin, and especially as the Soviet Union emerged as a
major industrial power, the complexities of trade and foreign
business relations could not be handled by a single Ministry alone.
A number of functions and agencies have been transferred out of
the Ministry of Foreign Trade to promote greater efficiency in the
management of foreign trade. The most important of these is the
Committee on Inventions and Discoveries formed in 1955 and
given concurrent authority with the Ministry of Foreign Trade

216. Decree on Foreign Trade, Mar. 13, 1922, cited in Osakwe, Legal and Institutional
Barriers to United States-Soviet Trade: Soviet Perspective, 8 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 83,
95 n.34 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Osakwe, Barriers to United States-Soviet Trade]
217. Resolution of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Worker-Peasant Party
(Bolsheviks) on Foreign Trade, Oct. 5, 1925, para. 2. Reprinted in J. QUIGLEY, supra note
215, at 206 App. C.
218. J. QUIGLEY, supra note 215, at 206. The monopoly concept has also been restated in
art. 73(10) of the new Soviet Constitution of 1977. See CONSTITUTION (BASIC LA w) OF THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet, Law of Oct. 7,
1977, reproduced in W. BuTLER, supra note 7, at 3.
219. Decree of August 24, 1953, creating the Ministry of Foreign Trade, 1 Shor. Zak
S.S.S.R. 268 (1968).
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over the patenting of Soviet inventions abroad. 220 The Committee
acquired the power in 1961 to sell licenses for Soviet products
abroad and to recommend to the USSR Council of Ministers the
purchase of licenses to foreign products. 221 The Committee also
shares its functions with what is now the State Committee for
Science and Technology, created in 1965 and reorganized in
1966. 222 Another important agency is the State Committee of the
USSR Council of Ministers for Foreign Economic Relations, which
was created in 1957. 223 All the above agencies work in close collaboration with the Ministry of Foreign Trade.
Other important agencies involved in Soviet foreign trade are
the State Planning Gommittee of the USSR Council of Ministers
(Gosplan); 224 the Ministry of Finance, which sets the limits to the
amount of foreign currency that can be used by the Foreign Trade
Ministry to purchase goods abroad; the state agency for foreign insurance, lngosstrakh; the State Bank of the USSR; the USSR
Ministry of Merchant Marine, which has responsibility over international maritime shipping; and the All-Union Chamber of Commerce, which, apart from arranging trade exhibits to promote
sales abroad, also operates two arbitration tribunals. The arbitration tribunals are the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission and
the Maritime Abritration Commission. 225
Although control of Soviet foreign trade is separated from
the control of domestic trade, foreign trade is, like domestic trade,
220. Art. 3(a) of the Statute on the Committee on Inventions and Discoveries of the
USSR Council of Ministers, confirmed by Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers, No. 274,
Feb. 23, 1956, cited in J. QUIGLEY, supra note 215, 96 n.15.
221. Art. 6 of the Methodological Instructions on the Procedure for Preparing
Materials on the Sale and Purchase of Licenses Abroad, promulgated by Decree of the Committee on Inventions and Discoveries of the USSR Council of Ministers, Dec. 19, 1961, cited
in Osakwe, Barriers to United States-Soviet Trade, supra note 216, at 98 n.49.
222. Statute on the State Committee of the USSR Council of Ministers for Science and
Technology, confirmed by Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers, October l, 1966. For
English text, see W. BUTLER, supra Qote 7, at 129.
223. Osakwe, Barriers to United States-Soviet Trade, supra note 216, at 98.
224. See Statute on the State Planning Committee of the USSR Council of Ministers
(Gosplan SSSR), confirmed by Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers, Sept. 9, 1968, as
amended Oct. 3, 1977. For English text, see W. BUTLER, supra note 7, at 123.
225. See J. QUIGLEY, supra note 215, at 76-79. For the resolution of foreign contractual
disputes by way of the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission see C. Norberg & D. Stein,
Arbitration of US-USSR Trade Disputes in BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS WITH THE USSR, supra
note 215, at 175. See also H. Berman & G. Bustin, supra note 215, at 49-53, and text accompanying notes 256-57, infra.
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determined by the requirements of the national economic plan.
The State Planning Committee (Gosplan) receives draft foreign
trade plans from the Ministry of Foreign Trade, which in turn are
determined by draft plans that the Ministry receives from the
foreign trade agencies themselves. Gosplan then draws up final
foreign trade plans as part of the overall national economic plan
which is then approved by the USSR Council of Ministers and
later confirmed by the Supreme Soviet. Under Article 3 of its
Statute, Gosplan is required in its plans to provide for the "expansion of international economic cooperation and raising the efficiency
of foreign trade." 226
More specific definition of Gosplan's powers and responsibilities in foreign trade is given in Article 4 of the Statute:
4:

There shall be entrusted to Gosplan SSR:

(i) the preparation with the participation of USSR ministries
and departments and union republic councils of ministers of proposals concerning the development of foreign economic ties of the
USSR, the improvement of inter-state specialization and cooperation of production, the coordination of plans for the development of
the USSR national economy with the national economic plans of
other member countries of the Council of Mutual Economic
Assistance;
(j) the working out with the participation of the Ministry of
Foreign Trade, the State Committee of the USSR Council of
Ministers for Foreign Economic Relations, USSR ministries and
departments, and union republic councils of ministers on the
basis of draft plans compiled by them, draft plans for the import
and export of goods, as well as draft plans for the delivery of
equipment and materials for objects being built abroad with the
technical assistance of the Soviet Union;
(k) the drawing up jointly with the USSR Ministry of
Finances on the basis of draft currency plans submitted by
USSR ministries and departments and by union republic councils
of ministers to draft composite annual currency plans (or payment balances), as well as reports concerning the fulfillment of
such plans .... 227

226. Article 3 of the Statute on The State Planning Committee of the USSR Council of
Ministers (Gosplan SSSR), supra note 224.
227. Id. art. 4(i)(j)(k).
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Some Important Principles of Soviet Import-Export Law

1.

OPERATIONAL PRINCIPLES OF FOREIGN TRADE

79

Today there are approximately sixty-nine Soviet importexport agencies or combines carrying out the bulk of Soviet foreign trade. 228 For export purposes, each combine purchases goods
from domestic economic enterprises and sells the goods abroad in
accordance with the export and import plan which has previously
been drawn up as described above by the superior state agencies,
the Foreign Trade Ministry, Gos plan, the USSR Council of
Ministers and the Supreme Soviet.
Each combine and production enterprise receives an export
plan from the appropriate ministry. The plan creates an administrative obligation owed by each combine to the Ministry of Foreign
Trade, and is fulfilled by the issuing of "order-requisitions"
(zakazynariady) by each combine to the production enterprise[s]
named in the plan. For the production enterprises, the order
requisition creates an administrative obligation to its ministry to
comply with the combine's order. 229
Under the Condition of Delivery of Goods for Export issued
by the Ministry of Foreign Trade, of January 26, · 1960, the combine's order must indicate the plan under which the order has
been issued as well as the name of the goods required, their basic
technical data, quality, quantity, packaging, and shipment dates. 230
If any of these conditions becomes disputed after the order
has been made, there is no arbitral remedy available as in the case
of domestic contract disputes. Indeed, the tra·nsaction between
combine and enterprise is not a contract, but the order of the combine is binding on the enterprise. This binding effect puts the
enterprise at a considerable disadvantage, which is further compounded by the power of a combine to unilaterally modify an order
which has already been issued if such modification "is required by
228. For a list of the combines (with names and description of goods dealt in) see
Loeber, Capital Investment in Soviet Enterprises? Possibilities and Limits of East-West
Trade, 6 ADEL. L. REV. 338, 356 (1977-78 hereinafter cited as Capital Investment); Osakwe,
Legal Aspects of Soviet-American Trade: Problems and Prospects, 48 TuL. L. REV. 536,
554-59 (1974).
229. J. QUIGLEY, supra note 215, at 129; H. Berman & G. Bustin, supra note 215, at 62.
230. Article 12 of the Conditions of Delivery of Goods for Export, Order of the Minister
of Foreign Trade, Jan. 26, 1960, No. 25, excerpt reprinted in J. QUIGLEY, supra note 215, at
219 App. G.
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conditions of sale of the goods to foreign purchasers." 231 An order
may also be modified or cancelled if there is a ministerial prohibition of trade relations with the country in question, or if there is a
change of plan by a superior agency (e.g., the Council of Ministers
or the Ministry of Foreign Trade). This situation is not different
from the automatic effect of changes in plan on domestic
contracts. 232
Article 28 of the 1960 Conditions of Delivery of Goods for Export establishes guarantee periods that bind the supplier-enterprise.233 If a long.e r period of guarantee is required by a foreign
purchaser, such a period can be negotiated between the combine
and the supplier-enterprise. 234 Similarly, the foreign purchaser is
not bound to accept the standards of quality and packaging specified in the 1960 Conditions, and may stipulate higher standards.
The combine may then stipulate the higher standards in its order
to the supplier-enterprise and compensate the supplier-enterprise
for the extra expense. 235
As with the export of goods, there is a plan for the import of
goods and for their distribution inside the Soviet Union. The plan
specifies what goods are to be imported by the various combines,
in what quantities, from which countries, and how they are to be
paid for. 236 Here the individual enterprises have a greater say. As
the end users of the imported goods, the individual enterprises are
allowed to apply to their ministry for import goods as an early
stage. The Ministry takes these applications into account before
submitting its own overall import application to Gospl,an. 231 Once
the plan has been confirmed, the USSR Council of Ministers issues
import permits to various supply-and-sales agencies which, in
turn, deliver to the appropriate combine "import-commissions" requesting the combine to contract with a foreign supplier for the
goods in question. 238 The combine may contract with any foreign
supplier as long as the foreign supplier is located within the country specified in the import plan. The prudent foreign supplier
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

Id. art. 19.
See text accompanying note 129, supra.
Article 28 of the "Conditions of Delivery of Goods for Export," note 230, supra.
Id.
Id. art. 35.
J. QUIGLEY, supra note 215, at 163.
Id. at 164.
Id. at 165.
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would therefore wish to ensure not only that the particular goods
have been authorized for import into the USSR, but also that the
goods in question can be imported into the USSR from his country. This may not necessarily be problematic for the foreign supplier since in addition to the import permit already issued by the
Council of Ministers to the supply-and-sales agency, the combine
itself has to obtain an import license from the Ministry of Foreign
Trade before it can contract with a foreign supplier. Before issuing the license to the combine the Ministry will carefully check the
combine's proposed foreign supplier, the foreign supplier's country, and the proposed terms of the transaction. 239
In the event of any dispute over the imported goods it is the
combine's duty to use or settle with its foreign business partner
and pass on to the supply-and-sales agency, or the end user of the
imported goods, whatever it is able to obtain from the suit or settlement. 240
Most of Soviet foreign trade is carried out by a number of
export-import agencies or combines. Each combine is a juridical
person under Soviet law and specializes in a group of commodities
drawn up by the· Minister of Foreign Trade in the form of a list
which is generally included in the combine's constituent instrument.241 A combine specializing in one group of commodities may
not deal in any other unauthorized commodity, otherwise the deal
may be ultra vires and therefore unenforceable. 242 The foreign
businessman should therefore ensure that the transaction in question is authorized by his Soviet partner's commodities list. 243 Other
commodities can be added to a combine's list by means of ad hoc
authorization from the Foreign Trade Ministry. 244 In the event of
239. H. Berman & G. Bustin, supra note 215, at 63; J. QUIGLEY, supra note 215, at 167.
240. In 1960, in a case concerning the Minsk Raw Materials Center and the combine
Raznoexport, the combine was compelled by order of State A rbitrazh of the USSR Council
of Ministers to settle a dispute as to the quality of goods it had imported from a foreign supplier, cited in J. QUIGLEY, supra note 215, at 170.
241. Osakwe, Barriers to United States-Soviet Trade, supra note 216, at 104. See also H.
Berman & G. Bustin, supra note 215, at 46.
242. H. Berman & G. Bustin, supra note 215, at 46; J. QUIGLEY, supra note 215, at 116.
243. Article 50 of the RSFSR Civil Code, reprinted in W. GRAY & R. STULTZ, supra
note 191. Under Article 49 of the RSFSR Civil Code, a contract contrary to the interests of
the state or against public policy is void ab initio. The foreign businessman should therfore
be aware that other Soviet statutes in addition to the combine's charter may govern the
transaction in question.
244. Osakwe, Barriers to United States-Soviet Trade, supra note 216, at 105.
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any doubt as to a particular combine's authority, the combine's
foreign business partner could always insist that the combine seek
clarification, approval or further authorization, as the case may be,
from the Ministry of Foreign Trade.
2.

FORMAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE CONCLUSION OF
FOREIGN TRADE CONTRACTS

Soviet law establishes certain formalities for the creation of
valid foreign business contractual relations. The most important
requirement is that all contracts must be in writing and signed by
two persons on the Soviet side, the chairman of the combine (or his
deputy) and a person authorized to sign foreign trade transations.
Monetary obligations, such as bills of exchange, need the signatures of the combine's chairman (or his deputy) and its chief accountant. 245 If the transaction is concluded outside Moscow or
abroad, it needs the signatures of two persons holding a power of
attorney from the combine's chariman. 246
Just as all oral contracts have to be reduced to writing, so
must all subsequent amendments or variations to the contract.
The signature requirements relating to new contracts apply to
amendments as well. 247
Observance of the above formalities is especially important in
the event of a dispute. Thus, an unrecorded oral agreement between a Soviet combine and a foreign corporation to resolve all
disputes by arbitration would be invalid inside the Soviet Union. 248
Likewise an arbitral award made abroad under an unrecorded
agreement would be unenforceable in the Soviet Union, regardless
of where the contract was concluded. 249 As Osakwe has observed,
"[t]his is a strict departure from the universally recognized princi245. Id. at 107.
246. Law No. 1 of Dec. 26, 1935, Procedure for Signing Foreign Trade Transactions
(1936], cited in Osakwe, Barriers to United States-Soviet Trade, supra note 216, at 107, n.81.
247. Osakwe, Barriers to United States-Soviet Trade, supra note 216, at 107.
248. Article 45 of the Civil Code of the RSFSR provides that "[n]on-observance of the
form of legal acts in foreign trade or of the procedure for signing them (Article 565) results
in the invalidity of such acts." Article 565 of the RSFSR Civil Code provides in part that
"[t]he form of legal acts concluded by Soviet organizations in connection with foreign trade
and the procedure for signing such acts are governed by legislation of the USSR, regardless
of the place in which they are concluded." For an English translation of the Civil Code of the
RSFSR see W. GRAY & R. STULTS, supra note 191.
249. S. PISAR, COEXISTENCE AND COMMERCE: GUIDELINES FOR TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN
EAST AND WEST 306 (1970). See also H. Berman & G. Bustin, supra note 215, at 45.
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pie of lex loci contracti and is a perilous trap into which an unwary
foreign businessman may fall." 250
In the interest of speedy dispute settlement not only should
the contract be in writing, but provision must also be made regarding the forum in which controversies should be litigated and
the system of law under which they will be resolved. The trend
seems to be toward arbitration being fixed in Western Europe,
with Stockholm being a favored site. 251 The foreign businessman
should, however, be aware that the Soviet combine, while it does
have wide discretion in negotiating the terms of a contract, may
not always be able to accept the forum and law preferred by him.
As Pisar has observed:
The unitary nature of the commercial structure affords the
Ministry of Foreign Trade ample opportunity to require its
licensed trading instrumentalities to forego submissions to alien
forums, alien laws and other "unapproved" clauses. The party's
formal autonomy to express contractual intentions is thus largely
negated by the lack of a will independent of the state's. 252

3.

IMPORT ANT PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE RULES OF
SOVIET FOREIGN CONTRACT LAW

Soviet enterprises themselves are never parties to foreign
trade contracts. The contract is between a foreign party and the
appropriate combine. In the event of breach of contract by either
party, it is either the combine that sues the foreign partner or the
foreign partner who sues the combine alone, even if in the latter
case the breach was due to the fault of the supplier/producer enterprise. The combine may then sue the enterprise before State
Arbitrazh in a separate action. 253 Thus, for example, if under a
typical export contract the combine has to pay damages to its
foreign partner for defective goods, the 1960 Conditions of Delivery of Goods for Export allows the combine to recover the dam250. Osakwe, Barriers to United States-Soviet Trade, supra note 216, at 108.
251. Fitzpatrick, Soviet-American Trade: 1972-74: A Summary, 15 VA. J. INT'L L. 39, 63
(1974). See also C. Norberg & D. Stein, supra note 225, at 179.
252. S. PISAR, supra note 249, at 299. Arbitration could of course be arranged before
the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission in Moscow or the Maritime Arbitration Commission, either which would probably be preferred by the Soviets to almost any other venue.
See H. Berman & G. Bustin, supra note 215, at 49.
253. J. QUIGLEY, supra note 215, at 144.
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ages from the enterprise. 254 If the foreign trade contract provides
for arbitration by the All-Union Chamber of Commerce's Foreign
Trade Arbitration Commission, and if the foreign partner seeks
arbitration in that forum, the combine being "sued" may bring the
enterprise into the suit as co-defendant, if the enterprise and the
foreign plaintiff both consent. This procedure is not specifically
provided for by legislation but it has been developed by the Commission itself. 255 Ordinarily, the Commission handles only
"disputes arising from foreign trade transactions, in particular
disputes between foreign firms and Soviet economic
organizations." 256 Furthermore, any agreement by a Soviet combine to arbitrate before the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission has the force of law in the Soviet Union and an a ward of the
Commission itself is binding. 257
Finally, the principle of liability based on fault, discussed in
relation to domestic contracts, 258 also applies to foreign trade with
some modifications. If, for example, a combine knowingly exports
defective goods, it cannot recover from the supplier-enterprise the
damages that the combine might have to pay the foreign purchaser .259 However, the combine can, in such a situation, always
sue the supplier-enterprise for statutory penalties under the Conditions of Delivery of Goods for Export, since statutory penalties
can be collected without proof of damage. 26° Furthermore, penalties continue to accumulate against the enterprise until there is
actual performance. This can be changed only if the enterprise's
ministry intervenes and negotiates a change with the combine. 261
In the event of a change of plan ordered by a superior agency,
254. Article 80 of the "Conditions of Delivery of Goods for Export", supra note 230,
provides:
Financial disputes connected with delivery of goods for export, in which one of the
parties is a foreign trade organization, shall be resolved in Moscow in the procedure specified in the Statute of State A rbitrazh.
Other disputes connected with delivery of goods for export shall be resolved
by the appropriate arbitrazh under established jurisdictional rules.
255. J. QUIGLEY, supra note 215, at 144 n.124.
256. Article 1 of the Decree of the Central Executive Committee and Council of
People's Commissars, "On the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission of the All-Union
Chamber of Commerce," June 17, 1932, cited in J. QUIGLEY, supra note 215, at 159 n.123.
257. Osakwe, Barriers to United States-Soviet Trade, supra note 216, at 99 n.53.
258. See text accompanying notes 99 and 148-49, supra.
259. J. QUIGLEY, supra note 215, at 146.
260. Id. at 145-46.
261. Id. at 148.
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the principle of liability based on fault is modified in foreign trade
contracts in the same way that it is modified for domestic contracts. 262 Thus, if a change of plan requires the combine to cancel
an export order already placed with a supplier-enterprise, the supplier-enterprise has no remedy against the combine even if the
goods have been prepared and shipped. Similarly, the combine is
not liable if cancellation was due to a revocation of an export license or a prohibition of trade relations against the country in
question issued by the appropriate authority .263 As was already
noted, 264 a combine can also unilaterally modify a prior order if this
is "required by the conditions of sale of the goods to foreign purchasers."265
These modifications to the rule in favor of the combines
reflect the privileged position which the export combines continue
to enjoy internally under the Soviet law of foreign trade.

C.

Some Pertinent Contractual Problems of East- West Joint
Ventures within the Planned Economy

1.

INTRODUCTION

The rapid rise in East-West trade since the late 1960's has
been characterized by the development of new forms of business
relationships between Eastern and Western enterprises. As far as
the Soviet economy is concerned~ its planned nature and the monopoly of the State in foreign trade have kept it relatively insulated from foreign business participation inside the Soviet Union.
Foreign participation has been limited to economic cooperation
agreements involving sales of equipment, licenses, entire production units together with technical assistance to set them in operation, subcontracting of components, collaboration in research and
development, and co-production. 266 However, all of these types of
agreements associate the parties in a contractual relationship in
which they clearly maintain their separate identities and exchange goods and services on the fixed-payment basis. The rela262. See text accompanying notes 145-49, supra.
263. Article 41 of the "Conditions of Delivery of Goods for Export," supra note 230.
264. See text accompanying note 231, supra.
265. Article 19, of the "Conditions of Delivery of Goods for Export," supra note 230.
266. C. McMILLAN & D. ST. CHARLES, JOINT VENTURES IN EASTERN EUROPE: A THREE
COUNTRY COMPARISON 10 (1974). This work was published under the auspices of the C.D.
Howe Research Institute and the Canadian Economic Policy Committee.

Published by SURFACE, 1980

57

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 8, No. 1 [1980], Art. 3

86

Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com.

[Vol. 8:29

tionship is terminated upon the completion of the transaction.
There are, consequently, no economic arrangements at present in
the Soviet Union between foreign business firms and Soviet economic agencies involving joint management and the sharing of profits or losses. 267 Examples of such associations, often called joint
ventures, do however exist in a number of eastern European countries such as Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Romania. 268
East-West joint ventures established in the three socialist
countries mentioned above are distinguishable by the mechanism
that each country has adopted to regulate currency and accounting problems. All Romanian joint venture operations are in foreign currency and the joint venture is said to create an exclusive
foreign currency "enclave" within the local monetary system. 269 In
Hungary, joint venture accounting is done under the "calculation
system" whereby transations are undertaken in both hard foreign
currency and local currency depending on whether the transaction
in question is a local one or an external one. 270 In Yugoslavia the
"integration system" is used whereby the joint venture is fully incorporated into the national economic order. All accounting is
done in local currency .211
A joint venture is likely to be a much more complex undertaking than any of the more common forms of industrial cooperation
presently existing between East and West. As such, the joint venture contract would need to make detailed provisions for property
267. Berman, Joint Ventures Between United States Firms and Soviet Economic
Organizations, 1 INT'L TRADE L.J. 139, 144 (1975-76) (hereinafter cited as Joint Ventures).
A joint venture is essentially a contractual arrangement between Eastern and Wes tern
enterprises under which an identifiable entity is created to undertake joint-production
marketing and other activities. The parties establishing the entity contract to pool their
productive resources, and undertake to manage its operation jointly and to share all of the
risks associated with the venture.
268. C. McMILLAN & D. ST. CHARLES, supra note 266, at 27, 45, 61. See generally
Scriven, Joint Venture Legislation in Eastern Europe: A Practical Guide, 21 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 633 (1980); Note, The Legal Framework for American Direct Investment in Eastfrn
Europe: Romania, Hungary and Yugoslavia, 7 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 187 (197 4); Dagon,

Cooperation Agreements and Joint Ventures with Socialist Business Associations: The
Hungarian System, 21 AM. J. COMP. L. 752 (1973); Morse & Goekjian, Joint Investment Opportunities with the Socialist Republic of Romania, 29 Bus. LAW. 133 (1973); Sukijasovic,
Legal Aspects of Foreign Investment in Yugoslavia, 37 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 474 (1972).
269. Capital Investment, supra note 228, at 347.
270. Pedersen Joint Ventures in the Soviet Union: A Legal and Economic Perspective,
16 HARV. INT'L L.J. 390, 400 (1975).
271. Capital Investment, supra note 228, at 347-48. See generally Friedman, The Contractual Joint Venture, 10 COL. J. WORLD Bus. 57 (1972).
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rights, management, risk-sharing, prices, profits, currency and accounting mechanisms, enterprise operation, dispute settlement,
securing regular supplies of needed materials from domestic supply sources, and integrating these needs into the national plan. 272 It
would be beyond the scope of this study to discuss all the legal and
economic ramifications of joint ventures in the USSR. The present
section will therefore, in accordance with the general aim of the
study, be limited to an examination of the relationship between
plan and contract (i.e., the joint venture contract) and the possible
methods of dispute settlement.
2.

THE JOINT VENTURE CONTRACT AND THE NATIONAL PLAN

As one of the essential characteristics of a joint venture is
shared management of the enterprise, a major question which
arises is whether such management is possible in a centrally planned economy. Under the Soviet Constitution the State has an absolute monopoly over foreign trade, while internally the economy is
planned and administered under a hierarchical system of administrative authorities.
For a foreign firm to enter into a joint venture contract inside
the Soviet Union, the foreign firm would need direct access to its
Soviet partner and the ability to exercise a minimum of operational influence on it. It would also clearly be in the interest of the
foreign firm to ensure that its Soviet counterpart is acting intra
vires and that the contract itself conforms to all the formal requirements of Soviet law, especially that it be in writing.
None of these requirements pose insurmountable barriers to
the creation of j~int ventures in the Soviet Union. The present capacities and powers of Soviet foreign trade combines make them
suitable partners for joint venture agreements. There is an almost
total separation of foreign transactions from domestic trade. The
foreign trade combine is given considerable latitude in negotiating
the terms of foreign contracts and enjoys certain ptivileges not
available to the domestic enterprise. 273 It has been said that Soviet
foreign trade combines, as juridical persons and as the sole representatives of the state in matters of foreign trade, can incur any
kind of contractual obligation they desire, even if it is in contradic272. See Scriven, supra note 268, at 642-56.
273. See text accompanying notes 231 and 263-65, supra. See also S.
249, at 298.
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tion to domestic law, as long as the contract does not exceed the
authority granted in the charter. 274 The charters of the combines
are themselves usually couched in very broad terms. A typical example is the Charter of the combine Stankoimport, which provides
that in order to carry out its functions the combine shall have the
right to:
(a) conclude contracts both in the USSR and abroad, conclude all kinds of transactions and other legal undertakings ...
sue and be sued in courts and arbitral tribunals;
(b) construct, acquire, alienate, take or let on lease, both in
the USSR and abroad, enterprises pertinent to its activity;
(c) acquire, alienate, take or let on lease all kinds of movable
or immovable property, both in the USSR and abroad;
(d) establish both in the USSR and abroad ... branches, offices, representatives, and agencies, and participate in any type
of combine, society, association, or organization whose activity
corresponds to the tasks of the combine. 275

There seems, therefore, to be no legal restriction either in the
Constitution or in practice that would prevent a combine from contracting a joint venture with a foreign firm. The joint venture
could then itself enjoy the same status as a combine, the contract
being the charter. Likewise, there is no restriction that would prevent exemption of the joint venture from bureaucratic control
from the central administration or from the requirements of the
national economic plan itself. 276
It would be in the interest of both parties to ensure that the
contract is as detailed as possible. From the Soviet point of view
the more detailed the contract the more predictable it becomes;
the greater the predictability under the contract, the greater will
be the ability of the parties to define and control their activity in
advance. This in turn would allay any fears that the central plan27 4. Pedersen, supra note 270, at 410.
275. Article 6 of the Charter of the All-Union Export-Import Combine "Stankoimport,"
reprinted in J. QUIGLEY, supra note 215, at 216 App. F., Stankoimport specializes in exports
and imports of machine tools, forging and pressing equipment, roll turning lathes, foundry
equipment, measuring machines and tools, instruments, hard alloy products, abrasive products and bearings; art. 5 of the Charter. The above quoted formulations from Article 6 of
the Charter of Stankoimport appear in the charters of nearly all combines and have been
restated in Article 10 of the Statute of the AU-Union Economically Accountable Foreign
Trade Combine approved by the Council of Ministers of the USSR, May 31, 1978, cited in
Capital Investment, supra note 228, at 354.
276. Pedersen, supra note 270, at 407.

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol8/iss1/3

60

Dore: Plan and Contract in the U.S.S.R.

Plan and Contract in the U.S.S.R.

1980]

89

ning agencies might have of laissez-faire economics creeping into
the socialist economy. From the viewpoint of a foreign partner,
the more detailed the contract, the greater will be the protection
given to the foreign partner's investment, and the more satisfied
it will be that the appropriate Soviet agencies and combines will
behave in accordance with the best interest of the venture.
The contract should specify how the joint venture should be
freed from the restrictions of the planned economy. Some of the
most important restrictions which could be avoided include "directive planning, unlimited inspections, freedom from changes in
plans or orders without prior consultation, absolute dependence
on Soviet sources of supply, turnover taxes, and success indicators
other than profits." 277 Thus, for example, the joint venture contract should be specifically insulated from Article 234 of the Civil
Code of the RSFSR which provides that changes in the national
plan may cancel contracts; nor should such changes be allowed to
interrupt or in any way jeporadize the joint venture's sources of
supply within or outside the Soviet Union. 278
It is with regard to securing the joint venture's supplies within
the Soviet Union ~hat the joint venture's needs would require some
integration into the national plan. Also to be intergrated would be
the sales of the finished product by the joint venture to Soviet enterprises. Such sales could be regarded as foreign transactions (i.e.,
between an appropriate foreign trade combine on the one hand and
the joint venture on the other). These sales would be treated as
conventional import contracts, regulated by the general importexport law and requiring incorporation into the foriegn trade
plan.219
While the sales of finished products to Soviet enterprises
would need some integration, securing the joint venture's supplies
from Soviet sources would need more detailed planning and incorporation into the system of material-technical supply, and,
therefore, the plan. Such incorporation would, however, be in the
interests of the joint venture since once the plan is ratified by the
Supreme Soviet, it becomes binding on all the lower enterprises,
including those acting as supply sources to the joint venture. 280
277.
278.
279.
280.

Berman, Joint Ventures, supra note 267, at 150.
Pedersen, supra note 270, at 418.
See generally text accompanying notes 236-40, supra.
Pedersen, supra note 270, at 418-19; J. QUIGLEY, supra note 215, at 79.
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The needs of the joint venture would, however, be something
which the joint venture would decide for itself and transmit,
through an appropriate agency or combine, to the central authorities for incorporation into the national plan. Upon incorporation, the
joint venture would become bound to accept the supplies (subject to
appropriate safeguards in the contract as to quality, production
deadlines, and penalties) with the knowledge that its stipulated
domestic supplies are guaranteed. The actual procedure would take
much the same form as that of a conventional export contract: the
appropriate combine would issue an "order-requisition" (zakaznariad) to the domestic enterprise through the Ministry. 281 The
enterprise would be bound to produce and deliver the materials or
goods in question, which the combine would then sell to the joint
venture.
One authority is of the belief that because of the joint venture's inevitable reliance on the involvement in the network of material-technical supply, "the entire operation of the joint venture,
down to the last details, should, if it is to succeed, be cleared in advance with at least a dozen different Soviet bureaucracies, starting with Gosplan and ending with the local soviet." 282
The joint venture legislation of Romania, which is seen by
many to be an attractive model for the Soviet Union, 283 provides an
elaborate procedure for the formation of joint ventures in Romania. It requires the drawing up of a feasibility study, a memorandum of association, a contract of association, and appropriate
statutes, all of which are reviewed at different stages by various
state agencies including the State Planning Committee, the Ministry of Labor, the Bank of Foreign Trade, the Ministry of Foreign
Trade, and the Council of Ministers. 284 If the Soviets follow the
Romanian model, elaborate prior screening procedures may be
necessary for the formation of joint ventures in the Soviet Union.
As for sales by joint ventures in the Soviet Union to non281. See text accompanying notes 229-235, supra. See also H . Berman & G. Bustin,
supra note 215, at 61.
282. Berman, Joint Ventures, supra note 267, at 150.
283. C. McMILLAN & D. ST. CHARLES, supra note 266, at 3; Pedersen, supra note 270, at
401, 406-07.
284. Article 16 of the Joint Companies Decree, Decree 424 of 2 Nov. 1972, Concerning
Constitution, Organization and Operation of Joint Companies in the Socialist Republic of
Romania, cited in Burgess, Direct Foreign Investment in Eastern Europe: Problems and
Prospects of Romania's Joint Venture Legislation, 6 LA w & POL. INT'L Bus. 1059, 1079-83.
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Soviet buyers, there should be no reason why this could not be
done directly by the joint venture itself, especially if, as suggested
above, 285 the joint venture has been granted the status of a foreign
trade combine. Such sales would be "foreign transactions" from
the Soviet viewpoint, and since all foreign trade is treated differently from domestic transactions, such sales would have little
impact on the domestic plan. 286 A power to buy and sell abroad
directly by the joint venture could always be stipulated in its
original contract or charter. If this is found to be impossible, the
contract could provide for the joint venture's foreign purchases
and sales through designated foreign trade combines. 287
Whatever the procedure adopted, it has been recommended
that all, or at least most, of the joint venture's transactions should
be carried out in hard currency since prices and profits are centrally established in the Soviet economic system. 288
In conclusion, it would seem that as far as the national economic plan is concerned, complete exclusion of the joint venture
therefrom would be neither possible nor desirable. The joint venture contract, however, in making detailed provisions governing
the activity of the venture, should spell out in what ways the joint
venture is to be freed from the restrictions of the plan.
3.

SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES ARISING FROM THE
JOINT VENTURE

Disputes between economic enterprises operating domestically in the Soviet Union are settled by the special system of economic courts known as the State Arbitrazh. 289 This institution
285. See text accompanying note 276, supra.
286. Pedersen, supra note 270, at 423.
287. The idea is partly borrowed from Pedersen who suggests that the joint venture
contract could:
[P]rovide for acquisition of many of its supplies from abroad by including ... a
provision that it is "expected" that certain supplies will be purchased abroad by
designed FTO's [Foreign Trade Organizations] under long-term contracts and
according to the specifications desired by the joint venture. This procedure would
avoid joint venture participation in the foreign trade monopoly [on the assumption
that the joint venture is not granted FTO status] while simultaneously giving the
joint venture authority to place supply orders through FTO's directly without going through the appropriate ministry.
Id. at 423-24.
288. Id. at 424-30. This would be following the Romanian example. Article 22 of the
Romanian Joint Companies Decree, cited in Burgess, supra note 284, at 1083.
289. See Part I, Sections A and E of this study, supra.
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serves as a watchdog over the plan-implementation process as a
whole. It is because of the clear orientation of the institution
toward state interests, and its commitment to the primacy of the
plan, that A rbitrazh would not prove acceptable to the foreign investor as a forum for resolving joint venture contractual disputes.
On the other hand, if the joint venture is insulated from the undesirable restrictions of the plan to the satisfaction of the foreign
partner, it is not inconceivable for the foreign partner to agree to
submit to Arbitrazh those disputes in which the national plan is
not relevant.
Perhaps a more attractive alternative to the foreign investor
would be the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission of the AllUnion Chamber of Commerce. 290 The Commission's jurisdiction can
be said to extend to joint venture disputes since it is empowered,
in part, to handle "disputes between foreign firms and Soviet
economic organizations." 291
Third-country arbitration would be another possibility. The
joint venture legislation of Romania provides for the settlement of
disputes either in the local law courts or by arbitration. 292 In the
case of arbitration, the parties may use the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission of the Romanian Chamber of Commerce or an
international tribunal. 293 Thus in one Romanian joint venture, the
parties chose arbitration under the procedures of the International Chamber of Commerce in Switzerland, 294 while in another,
arbitration was stipulated under the procedures of the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris. 295
As seen with regard to conventional Soviet import-export
contracts 296 the Soviets have shown a willingness to accept arbitra290. Decree of the Central Executive Committee and Council of Peoples Commissars
on the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission of the All Union Chamber of Commerce,
June 17, 1932, SZ SSSR (1932) No. 48, item 281.
291. Id., art. 1. See also C. Norberg & D. Stein, supra note 225 at 177, and text accompanying note 257, supra.
292. Article 38 of the Romanian Joint Companies Decree, cited in Burgess, supra note
284, at 1099.
293. Burgess, supra note 284, at 1099.
294. Joint venture between Zahnraderfabrik Renk AG of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Romanian Industrial Central for Machine Construction at Resita, Oct. 6, 1973,
cited in Burgess, supra note 284, at 1061.
295. Joint Venture between Control Data Corp. of the U.S. with the Romanian Industrial Central for Electronics and Vacuum Technology, Apr. 4, 1973, cited in Burgess,
supra note 284, at 1061.
296. See text accompanying note 251, supra; C. Norberg & D. Stein, supra note 225, at
180-84.
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tion in neutral third countries, with Stockholm being a popular
site. If the parties choose such arbitration to settle joint venture
disputes, they would nevertheless have to stipulate the arbitration procedures to be followed.
It has also been suggested that since some joint venture disputes could involve complex technical matters, there may be an
agreed procedure of "on-site arbitration" by technical experts
rather than trained arbitrators. 297 It is, however, possible that
both parties may prefer limiting the role of technical experts to a
purely advisory level to promote an amicable settlement, while
providing for formal arbitration as a last resort. The chosen arbitral tribunal could always be empowered, or even obliged, to take
into account expert testimony and advice before rendering a decision.

D.

Conclusion

In the regulation of the domestic industry in the Soviet
Union, contracts are seen to have a dual role as a mechanism for
the central control of the economy and, within certain limits, as a
means of exercising enterprise initiative. It is also evident that
the legal institution of contract and the quasi-judicial/administrative institution of Arbitrazh both operate on the fundamental principle of the supremacy of the plan. 298
This basic principle remains inviolable in the sphere of foreign trade as well. In the foreign trade sphere, the fundamental
principle of state monopoly over foreign trade serves to buttress
the primacy of the plan. Plan changes made by the agencies entrusted with the foreign trade monopoly can nullify agreements
between foreign trade combines and domestic enterprises without
the domestic enterprises having any remedy. The effect of a
change of plan on domestic contracts is, of course, identical.
Yet, because of the inherent nature of foreign trade, there is
not, and cannot be, a Soviet judicial or administrative agency
parallel to A rbitrazh having compulsory jurisdiction over all
foreign trade disputes. Dispute settlement, the choice of law, and
the forum of settlement are left to the agreement of the combine,
with appropriate checks from above, and the foreign party. The
function of A rbitrazh in domestic trade as watchdog over the plan297. Pedersen, supra note 270, at 436.
298. See Part I, supra.
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implementing process is, in the sphere of foreign trade, exercised
by the Ministry of Foreign Trade. Each combine, once it receives
its export plan, owes an administrative obligation to the Foreign
Trade Ministry to fulfill its export orders. Imports, too, are strictly overseen by the Ministry. Even after import permits have been
issued by the Council of Ministers, the import combine, before contracting abroad, must obtain another import license from the
Ministry.
It is perhaps due to the absence of an A rbitrazh-type agency
overseeing foreign trade, and bringing to heel erring enterprises,
that Soviet foreign contracts are so painstakingly scrutinized by
superior agencies, and why Soviet law prescribes strict procedural formalities for the conclusion of foreign trade contracts. It
would also be due to this reasoning that the Soviets prefer to
eliminate as much uncertainty as possible by insisting on detailed
provisions in the contract.
While the institution of contract vis-a-vis the plan is clearly in
a subordinate position for domestic as well as foreign trade, there
is one possible area of foreign trade where there could be tension
between plan and contract. This is the field of joint ventures. It is
a tension, however, which can be resolved, given some flexibility
and a desire to compromise on the part of both parties.
There would seem to be strong motivation on both .sides_ for
the formation of joint ventures. 299 For the West, the chief attractions would be wider markets, cheaper and stable labor costs·, and
the opportunity, not available under other forms of industrial
cooperation, to share in the management and control of an enterprise to which it contributes capital and technology, in return for a
share in the profits. 30° For the Soviet Union, there would be the
possibility of access to Western markets, obtaining much needed
up-to-date foreign technology, capital, and new managerial skills
and techniques. 301 Such benefits have already persuaded some
socialist countries to push aside ideological considerations and
favor joint ventures. It is conceivable that the same could happen
in the Soviet Union in the near future.
299. See Scriven, supra note 268, at 634, 662.
300. Capital Investment, supra note 228, at 338-39.
301. Id. See also Pedersen, supra note 270, at 394-97.
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